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I. INTRODUCTION
"Three strikes and you're out" may be good baseball. In 1994,
however, it turned out to be a case study of sound bite electioneer-
ing, substituting for careful analysis of complex social and penologi-
cal problems.
In 1992 Mike Reynolds, father of murder victim Kimber Rey-
nolds,' began a campaign to secure passage of one of the nation's
most draconian multiple-offender statutes.2 When Reynolds first
proposed "three strikes" to the legislature, the Assembly Public
Safety Committee soundly defeated the bill.3 Reynolds's subsequent
efforts may have failed but for the kidnapping and murder of
twelve-year-old Polly Klaas, whose plight galvanized the nation.4
Richard Allen Davis, Polly's admitted killer and a reeat of-
fender, symbolized the failure of the criminal justice system; Polly's
I. See George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born from Pain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1993, at A3. Convicted felon Joe Davis shot and killed Kimber Reynolds when she
resisted him after he attempted to take her purse. See id.
2. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 400-01 & nn.25-36 & app. A (1997) (detailing the
provisions of various state habitual offender statutes). Six of the 22 states that have
enacted "three-strikes" laws have had no convictions, while California's stringent law
has led to the imprisonment of 15,000 offenders. See Only California Using '3
Strikes' Law Widely, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 10, 1996, at A3. The California law
considers any of the state's 500 felonies-both violent and nonviolent-as a third
strike. See id. A University of Wisconsin study found that 85% of the second- and
third-strike convictions were for nonviolent offenses. See id.
"Three strikes" is used in this Article to describe both the statute adopted by
the legislature, Act of Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 12, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 56 (West)
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 667), and the voter initiative, Proposition 184, in
California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 [hereinafter California
Ballot Pamphlet] (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1997)). Un-
less otherwise noted, all statutory references in the text are to the California Penal
Code.
There is some debate whether the two provisions are identical. For example,
at least one trial court found significance in minor variation in the language of the
two laws. See People v. Hazelton, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 730, 731-32 (1995) (reversing trial
court's ruling that the voter initiative differed from the legislative version in the con-
text of extra-jurisdictional prior convictions), review granted and opinion superseded,
_ Cal. 4th -, 911 P.2d 429, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (1996), aff'd, 14 Cal. 4th 101, 926
P.2d 423,58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (1996).
3. See Skelton, supra note 1, at A3.
4. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
5. Richard Allen Davis's rap sheet was eleven pages long, including two prior
kidnapping convictions. See Richard Price, Town Angry at a System that Failed,
USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1993, at 1A. In his most recent stay in prison-a 16-year sen-
tence for kidnapping, assault, and burglary-he had served only half of his sentence
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death was a critical moment for "three strikes.",6 Within days of re-
ports of her murder, "three strikes" gathered 50,000 signatures and
was on its way to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in
California history.7 The public's support for the "three-strikes" ini-
tiative assured new interest in the legislature when the bill's propo-
nents resubmitted it.8
From the inception of "three strikes," 9 commentators along a
before early release for good behavior. See id. Davis would have been in jail on the
day Polly Klaas was abducted if he had served his entire sentence. See id. at 1A.
6. If there was any doubt about the intensity of the anger at Davis, Governor
Pete Wilson's loss of control during an interview with a reporter was telling. Wilson
said: "I mean, when I think of that son of a bitch, you cannot help but be angered.
Did you see the picture of him on the front page of the [San Francisco] Chronicle?
Smirking? Jesus, boy. I wanted to just belt him right across the mouth." George
Skelton, Wilson Seizes the Day After Polly's Murder, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at
A3. After the arrest politicians scurried to respond to the fears of their constituen-
cies. See Dan Morain, A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at
Al. Mike Reynolds's growing initiative was the perfect answer. His initiative, had it
been prior law, would have kept Richard Allen Davis in prison. See Price, supra
note 5, at 1A. The phrase "three strikes and you're out" was the perfect sound bite
for legislators anxious to capitalize on the publicized murder of Polly Klaas. See Mo-
rain, supra, at Al.
7. See Richard Kelly Heft, Legislating with a Vengeance, INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Apr. 26, 1995, at 27.
8. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
9. The legislative intent in enacting "three strikes" was to "ensure longer prison
sentences and greater punishment" for those who have committed prior felonies.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1997).
By enacting "three strikes" the legislature has mandated longer sentences as
follows: the law eliminates limitations on aggregate terms of imprisonment, see id. §
667(c)(1); see also id. § 1170.12(a)(1) (codifying the analogous provision of the voter
initiative); amended section 667 prohibits probation for second- or third-time felons
within its provisions, see id. § 667(c)(2); see also id. § 1170.12(a)(2) (voter initiative);
and the law withdraws judicial discretion to have offenders covered by its provisions
committed to diversion programs or to the California Rehabilitation Center, see id. §
667(c)(4); see also id. § 1170.12(a)(4) (voter initiative); further, it reduces the amount
of good-time credits that may be awarded to a maximum of one-fifth the total term
of the imposed sentence, see id. § 667(c)(5); see also id. § 1170.12(a)(5) (voter initia-
tive); and requires courts to sentence certain defendants to consecutive, rather than
concurrent, terms of imprisonment, see id. § 667(c)(6)-(8); see also id. §
1170.12(a)(6)-(8) (voter initiative).
Several other key provisions demonstrate the commitment to long terms of
imprisonment for a wide array of criminal defendants. Subsection 667(c)(3) provides
that "[t]he length of time between the prior felony conviction and the current felony
conviction shall not affect the imposition of sentence." Id. § 667(c)(3); see also id. §
1170.12(a)(3) (voter initiative). That is, there is no "wash-out" period, leaving older
offenders liable for violent or serious felonies committed during the height of their
criminal careers.
Subsections 667(d), (e), and (f) include the key provisions of the "three-
strikes" legislation. Subsection (d) identifies what is colloquially called a "strike."
See id. § 667(d); see also id. § 1170.12(b) (voter initiative). Specifically, subsection
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wide political spectrum raised serious questions about the legisla-
tion.' Nevertheless, the legislature passed "three strikes" by size-
667(d)(1) states that any offense listed in subsections 667.5(c) and 1192.7(c) is "a
prior conviction of a felony" for purposes of amended section 667, in other words,
one that will serve to trigger the law's enhancement provisions. Id. § 667(d)(1); see
also id. § 1170.12(b)(1) (voter initiative). Subsection 667.5(c) lists what are consid-
ered "violent" felonies and subsection 1192.7(c) lists "serious" felonies. See id. §
667.5(c); see also id. § 1192.7(c) (voter initiative).
Subsection 667(e) enhances punishment of the offender for his second strike.
See id. § 667(e)(1); see also id. § 1170.12(c)(1) (voter initiative). Under subsection
(e)(1), for an offender with a prior "serious" or "violent" felony conviction who has
a current felony conviction, one that need not be serious or violent, the term of im-
prisonment "shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the cur-
rent felony conviction." Id. § 667(e)(1); see also id. § 1170.12(c)(1) (voter initiative).
Subsection 667(e)(2)(A) is the "three strikes" provision of the law. See id. §
667(e)(2)(A); see also id § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (voter initiative). It provides that if a
defendant has two or more prior "serious" or "violent" felony convictions, the term
of imprisonment for the current felony conviction "shall be an indeterminate term of
life imprisonment." Id. § 667(e)(2)(A); see also id. § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (voter initia-
tive). The minimum sentence shall be the greater of three times the term of impris-
onment provided for each current felony, twenty-five years, or the term of impris-
onment determined by application of section 1170 plus other enhancement
provisions. See id. § 667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii); see also id. § 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii)
(voter initiative). Under this provision, in conjunction with subsection 667(c)(5),
which limits good time credits to one-fifth of the imposed sentence, the best that a
"three-strikes" defendant can hope for is a real term of twenty years in prison.
Subsection 667(f) is especially important in light of the realities of the crimi-
nal justice system. See id. § 667(f)(2); see also id. § 1170.12(d)(2) (voter initiative).
That provision was at issue in People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497,
917 P.2d 628,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996), and is discussed in detail below, infra notes
294-318 and accompanying text.
10. An excerpt from a letter directed to Governor Pete Wilson from the San Di-
ego County District Attorney's Office is telling in this regard: "[Three strikes] is not
a good bill; it is a bad bill. It is bad in concept, and it is bad in drafting. Inevitably it
will produce bad results. These bad results will be both harmful to the criminal jus-
tice system and embarrassing to the bill's proponents." Letter from Charles E.
Nickel, Chief, Training Division, Office of the District Attorney, County of San Di-
ego, to Pete Wilson, Governor, State of California 1 (Mar. 7, 1994) (on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). At the other end of the spectrum, the San
Francisco Public Defender wrote an article delineating the numerous flaws of the
legislation and warned that "Californians will witness repeated and accumulating in-
stances of unnecessary incarceration of non-dangerous offenders, as well as examples
of severe punishment for trivial offenses." Jeff Brown, Why California's "Three
Strikes Law" Is Terrible Legislation, 26 U. WST L.A. L. REV. 269, 281 (1995). In
fact, Polly Klaas's father, although initially a proponent of the legislation, publicly
opposed "three strikes" and advocated narrow legislation targeting only violent
criminals. See John Matthews, Klaas Father Opposes New '3 Strikes' Law,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 10, 1994, at A3.
Even more telling is that the chief assistant to Attorney General Dan Lun-
gren, George Williamson, also voiced concerns regarding the legislation: "I knew
there were going to be some big, big problems.... We were aware that there were
some drafting concerns which were significant." Dan Morain, Citing '3 Strikes,'
[Vol. 30:1601
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able majorities in both houses," and Californians voted in favor of
the initiative in overwhelming numbers.
12
Critics focused on numerous issues, some related to technical
drafting problems.13 But commentators also identified two substan-
tial state constitutional problems with both the legislation and the
initiative. First, subsection 667(e)(2)(A), the law's most controver-
sial provision, targets a defendant who has committed two prior
"violent" or "serious" felonies; when charged with a third felony, the
defendant must be sentenced to a minimum term of twenty-five
years to life. 14 Critics argued that because the third "strike" may be
any felony, punishments under the law may violate the state consti-
tutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. 5
Second, critics questioned the balance of power between the
judge and prosecutor under "three strikes." Typical sentencing
schemes give judges some discretion, allowing them to avoid exces-
sive sentences. "Three strikes" was different. Despite seeking the
assistance of a state appellate court judge in drafting the legislation,16
Lawyers to Shun Plea Bargains, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at Al. One Los Angeles
Superior Court judge gave an insightful summary of the general disdain toward
"three strikes": "I've never seen something before where D.A.s, defense lawyers
and judges agree. This thing is not working.... I've been a Republican all my life,
and I'm afraid I'm starting to sound like a Democrat." Jill Smolowe, Going Soft on
Crime, TIME, Nov. 14, 1994, at 63, 63.
11. Assembly Bill 971 (A.B. 971) passed the Assembly by a 63-9 margin on
January 31, 1994. See 1 ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 712 (Cal. 1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).
The Senate passed it by a 29-7 margin on March 3, 1994. See id.
12. Proposition 184, the "three-strikes" ballot initiative, received 72% of the
vote. See State Propositions, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at B4.
13. See, e.g., William M. Thornbury, What Is the Meaning of Three Strikes and
You Are Out Legislation?, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 303 (1995) (noting the poor
draftsmanship of the legislation and discussing its numerous ambiguities). For an
objective description of the technical deficiencies of the "three-strikes" initiative, see
GRACE LIDIA SUAREZ, SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC DEFENDER'S GUIDE TO THREE
STRIKES (1994).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
15. The California judiciary came to a consensus in this regard at a 1994 Cali-
fornia Judges Association seminar. At the convention judges agreed that some sen-
tences under the provisions of "three strikes" would be struck down as cruel and un-
usual punishment. See Scott Graham, Trial Judges Trying to Determine Their Role in
'Three Strikes' Cases, RECORDER (San Francisco), Sept. 27, 1994, at 3; see also Albert
J. Menaster, Eighteen Ways to Avoid Three Strikes, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 283,
299-301 (1995) (arguing that the "three-strikes" statute is cruel and unusual both per
se and as applied).
16. Judge James A. Ardaiz, presiding justice of the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal, and two other Fresno Municipal Court judges cooperated in drafting an initial
outline of the "three-strikes" measure. See Dan Morain, Judge Admits His Role in '3
Strikes' Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3.
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Reynolds distrusted judges even more than he distrusted legisla-
tors. 7 "Three strikes" was drafted to eliminate judicial discretion
while allowing a prosecutor to refuse to follow the sentencing provi-
sions "in the furtherance of justice."'8
Although not without ambiguity, 9 the law placed a judge in a
difficult position: if the judge believed that a prior conviction should
be "struck" in the interest of justice, the judge could do so only upon
motion of the prosecutor. Based on a line of cases beginning in
17. In an article addressing the recent California Supreme Court's decision in
Romero-returning discretion to the judiciary in "three-strikes" cases-Mike Rey-
nolds, leery of the judicial system, suggested that a list of specific conditions under
which a judge may strike a prior conviction be established in order to restrict judicial
discretion. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Pringle Out to Restore '3 Strikes', ORANGE
CoUrTY REG., June 21, 1996, at Al. Reynolds stated that "[t]hen what you've done
is painted the judges into a box. But it has to be a pretty tight box. These guys are
crafty. If you leave a crack in the door they'll drive a truck through it." Id.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(2), 1170.12(d) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that
a prosecuting attorney may strike a prior felony conviction in the furtherance of jus-
tice pursuant to section 1385 of the California Penal Code).
In analyzing the provisions of "three strikes," the California Senate Judiciary
Committee noted some of the constitutional problems of A.B. 971 and concluded
that in some cases "three strikes" would, in fact, impose cruel and unusual punish-
ment. See CALIFORNIA SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, 1993-1994
Reg. Sess. 8 (Feb. 17, 1994) (visited Mar. 15, 1997) <http://www.leginfo.
ca.gov/pub/93-94/billIasm/ab-0951-1000/ab_971__cfa_.940210_160740_sen_comm>
[hereinafter SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971]. Nevertheless, the purpose
behind subsection 667(0(2) was to remove judicial discretion. The appellate justices
in Romero expounded on the legislative purpose of this provision and noted that
"the clear intent of the electorate was to limit the power of the court." People v. Su-
perior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 377 (Ct. App. 1995), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996). The appellate
court further recognized the electorate's indignation with the "judicial system's re-
volving door" and noted that the proponents' ballot argument claimed that the
measure was brought to the voters as a reaction to "soft-on-crime judges" who
"spend all of their time looking for loopholes" to reduce punishment for defendants.
Id.
19. Confronted with the issue of whether section 667 of the California Penal
Code empowers the court to strike prior felony allegations on its own motion pursu-
ant to section 1385 of the California Penal Code, the California Supreme Court
wrote a 43-page opinion in which it concluded, in part, that the ambiguity of the
statute-which does not expressly prohibit trial courts from exercising their tradi-
tional power to strike prior felony convictions pursuant to section 1385-in and of
itself prohibits elimination of judicial discretion in this regard. See Romero, 13 Cal.
4th at 517-22, 917 P.2d at 639-48, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-09; see also id. at 522, 917
P.2d at 642, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803 ("The drafter's express invocation of section 1385
in the Three Strikes law, together with the absence of any language purporting to bar
courts from acting pursuant to it, virtually compels the conclusion no such prohibi-
tion was intended."). But see infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (doubting
Romero's statutory construction).
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1970,20 critics argued that subsection 667(f)(2) violated the state con-
stitutional separation-of-powers doctrine.
Critics of "three strikes" proved to be right on at least one
count. On June 20, 1996, the California Supreme Court held that
subsection 667(f)(2) did not eliminate judicial discretion.2 2 Despite a
unanimous decision in People v. Superior Court (Romero), the
court's statutory construction is certainly open to question. 4 More
importantly, six justices agreed that had the legislature denied
judges' discretion, the statute would violate the separation-of-
powers doctrine.5
Public reaction to Romero is mixed. While some commentators
26praise the decision, many target the court for undermining the will
20. See People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89,473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970).
21. Trial court judge William Mudd, who in the face of a newly enacted "three-
strikes" law insisted on striking Romero's prior felony convictions sua sponte, ren-
dered a principled decision based on precedent established by cases such as Tenorio.
"Judges are the conscience of the community," said Judge Mudd, "and should be
free to evaluate what type of sanction is appropriate." Anne Krueger, State High
Court to Rule on '3 Strikes', SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 31, 1996, at Al. At
Romero's sentencing hearing, Judge Mudd wrote the following: "I think this is a
significant piece of Legislation that basically castrates a judge. It takes away all of
the discretion and it places it squarely in the hands of the D.A. and that's the reason
it's a separation-of-powers argument." Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371. Several
other trial court judges followed the same line of reasoning to strike prior felony
convictions. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (O'Donnell), 49 Cal. App. 4th 194,47
Cal. Rptr. 333 (1995) (vacating trial court's decision to strike a prior felony convic-
tion to render defendant eligible for parole); People v. Petty, 46 Cal. App. 4th 723,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1995) (holding that the "three-strikes" provision did not give
trial court power to dismiss serious felony obligations); People v. Glaster, 45 Cal.
App. 4th 299, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (1995) (reversing trial court's decision to strike a
prior felony).
22. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 529-30, 917 P.2d at 647, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 808.
23. 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
24. See infra notes 318-21 and accompanying text.
25. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 513-17, 917 P.2d at 636-39, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-
800.
26. "'The mindless and inexorable demand for a life sentence for minor offenses
has become a bit more mindful."' Carey Goldberg, California Judges Ease 3-Strike
Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at Al (quoting Vincent Schiraldi, Executive Direc-
tor, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice). One reporter noted that "[j]udicial
discretion provides a safety valve, for defendants and for society. The law shouldn't
be a clichd that divides people; it should be an expression of our collective will, rea-
sonably enforced." Remodeling '3 Strikes', S.F. EXAMINER, June 23, 1996, at B10.
Notably concise, the ACLU stated that .'[i]f you take sentencing discretion away
from a judge, you may as well use a computer."' Tom Rhodes, 'Three-Strikes' Law
Ruled Illegal by California Court, TIMES (London), June 22, 1996, at 16 (quoting
Ramona Ripston, ACLU).
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of the people.27 During hearings on proposed amendments to "three
strikes" that would narrow judicial discretion, for example, some
witnesses and legislators suggested that liberal judges are at the root
of socidty's crime problem.' As observed by one commentator,
"three strikes" "came about because the judiciary dictated too much
leniency toward criminals."29
The court's critics also attacked Romero as antidemocratic.30
Like frequent conservative criticism of the United States Supreme
Court,31 commentators have lambasted the court for frustrating the
will of the people. Typical is the statement of one writer that
"[Romero] is another blow to a core principle of democracy-rule
by the people[; Romero] ... limit[s] the power of the people in favor
27. Several commentators fervently argue that the judiciary should not interfere
with the will of the people in cases where the legislation does not conflict with consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights. One reporter wrote that "[judges] should either admin-
ister [the law] or find new jobs, perhaps in the Legislature, where they could pursue
their legislating goals." David Kline, High Court Delivers a Wild Pitch Against Three
Strikes, CAPITOL NEws SERVICE, June 24, 1996, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Papers File. "The court's decision is a bad one," he continued, "and not just
because it ignores the will of the people .... [T]he ruling represents an attempt by
the supreme court to seize law-making authority from the legislative branch." Id.
California's Secretary of State, Bill Jones, responded with disdain to the Romero de-
cision and accused the judiciary of preserving its own territory at the expense of Cali-
fornians. "In publishing their decision," he stated, "the justices showed they are
more interested in protecting the turf of the bench than they are in protecting the
safety of Californians." Bill Ainsworth, Senate GOP Leader Urges Justices' Ouster,
RECORDER (San Francisco), June 21, 1996, at 1.
28. Senate Minority Leader Rob Hurtt advanced such a position at an Assembly
Public Safety Committee hearing in which he stated that "he wants to eliminate the
'horrifying reality that liberal judges can resume their practice of failing to get tough
on career criminals,"' and that "recidivists can go shopping for liberal judges." John
Jacobs, More Posturing on Three Strikes, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 30, 1996, at F4.
During this same hearing, Reynolds asserted that but for a liberal judge's sentencing
decision, Richard Allen Davis would have been in prison at the time he killed Polly
Klaas. See Letter from J. Charles Kelso, Director, Institute for Legislative Practice,
McGeorge School of Law, to Michael Vitiello (June 30, 1996) (on file with the Loy-
ola of Los Angeles Law Review). The prosecutor who handled the earlier case
against Davis corrected Reynolds, explaining that the judge sentenced Davis to a
maximum term and that Davis was released because of good-time credits. See id.
29. Steven Lawrence, Three Strikes, The People Are Out, RECORDER (San Fran-
cisco), June 26, 1996, at 4.
30. "Once again, democracy is thwarted. The people have spoken, and judges
have thwarted their will." African-Americans Slam California Supreme Court for
Elitist Interpretation of 'Three Strikes, You're Out,' PR NEWSWIRE, June 21, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter Elitist Interpretation]
(quoting a member of Project 21, an African-American leadership group).
31. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 130 (1990)
(commenting that for the past half-century the United States Supreme Court has in-
variably legislated items on the liberal agenda).
[Vol. 30:1601
June 1997] "THREE STRIKES" AND THE ROMERO CASE
of rule by judges, the philosopher kings. 3 2
The criticism is unfortunate and unfounded. Politicians fre-
quently engage in court-bashing, contributing to cynicism about an
important public institution.33 Constrained by ethical rules,3 judges
are not in a position to fight back. Lawyers and law professors, who
otherwise share similar institutional values, are often among the
loudest critics.
32. Lawrence, supra note 29, at 4.
33. "It's time to get the liberal judges out of there," stated a member of Project
21, an African-American leadership group. Elitist Interpretation, supra note 30. "We
need judges who will fight for the people and not the liberal elite. This country is
built on 'We the people' not 'we the judges, we the criminals."' Id.; see also Gilbert
S. Merritt, Judge-Bashing Only Undermines Public Confidence in Judiciary,
NASHVILLE BANNER, July 3, 1996, at All (Chief Judge Merritt, United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, noting some of the frequent criticisms hurled at the
judiciary: judges are "soft on crime," "against the death penalty," "corruptly pro-
tecting criminals," "losing the war on drugs," and "refusing to protect citizens against
violence").
Public confidence in the judiciary is the touchstone of judicial independence,
and continued denigration of the system undermines this confidence and weakens
the shield that protects Americans from the tyranny of the majority. The tendency
for politicians to jump on the bandwagon and engage in judge-bashing may be at-
tributed to the public's growing distrust of the judiciary. Chief Judge Merritt noted
that "[t]he distrust index is up, and it is clear that the public is now down on the ju-
diciary.... Polls tell politicians that the public lacks confidence in judges. So politi-
cians attack judges because they think that is where the votes are." Id. The Romero
decision, in particular, brought about an abundance of political criticism of the judi-
ciary. Governor Wilson, who appointed the judge who wrote the Romero opinion,
stated that '[w]e cannot tolerate a situation which permits judges who are philo-
sophically unsympathetic or politically disinclined to 'three strikes' to reduce the
strong sentences that the voters intended to impose on habitual criminals."' Rhodes,
supra note 26, at 16 (quoting Governor Pete Wilson). He further stated that the de-
cision was "potentially dangerous to public safety." Id. Senator Quentin L. Kopp
(Ind.-San Francisco) noted the importance of an independent judiciary and ex-
pressed, in this regard, that "[s]ome of these statements by the executive and legisla-
tive leaders, who ought to know their civics better, are unworthy of them and their
offices, and they're damaging to our democracy.... They're threatening the judici-
ary." Greg Krikorian & Dan Morain, State GOP Opens Drive to Thwart '3 Strikes'
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1996, at Al.
34. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct permits a judge to discuss the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice subject to the requirements of the Code.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcT Canon 4B (1990). The Code requires that
a judge must "respect and comply with the law and ... act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
Id. at Canon 2A. If judges were to publicly attack those critical of their decisions,
such behavior could put judges' impartiality in question. See, e.g., In re Schenck, 870
P.2d 185 (Or. 1994).
35. Legal scholarship, for example, often focuses on the inadequacies of judicial
decisions. See Robert L. Bard, Legal Scholarship and the Professional Responsibility
of Law Professors, 16 CONN. L. REV. 731, 738-39 (1984).
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Far from an attack on democracy, Romero demonstrates why
we need independent judges. The claim that Romero has frustrated
the will of the people is simply wrong. This Article reviews the pas-
sage of the "three-strikes" law and argues that democracy failed.36
"Three strikes" passed as a result of public panic, flamed by politi-
cians who spurned rational debate.3 Powerful lobbying groups,
beneficiaries of "get tough on crime" legislation, actively supported
"three strikes."38 A number of politicians had doubts about the effi-
cacy of "three strikes"; few were willing to slow its course through
the legislature. While many tout the initiative process as democ-
racy in action,4 politicians' extravagant rhetoric prevented the elec-
torate from making a fully informed decision on "three strikes." For
example, political maneuvering prevented a less draconian alterna-
tive from appearing on the ballot.4' Proposition 184's proponents
were also able to publish misleading information about its provisions
42as part of the initiative process.
Reliance on the initiative process makes reform of bad legisla-
tion difficult. No doubt that was the intent of its supporters.43 Re-
36. See infra Part II.A-B.
37. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 144-77 and accompanying text.
40. For example, the Republican Office of Assembly Research published a pam-
phlet supporting the "three-strikes" measure, stating that
[o]nly when we formulate our punishments on the basis of what is just and
equitable is there a role for the democratic process.... In the case of crime
legislation in 1994, California's citizens recognized the outra eous dispro-portion between crimes and punishments; they participated i the demo-
cratic process to effect the appropriate changes.
Last year's anti-crime measures did much to restore the principle of de-
mocracy to'its rightful place in our state's criminal-justice system.
RONALD J. PESTRITTO, JR., CAL. LEGISLATURE, REPUBLICAN OFFICE OF ASSEMBLY
RESEARCH, IN DEFENSE OF THREE-STRIKES: ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF CALI-
FORNIA'S 1994 ANTI-CRIME MEASURES 13.
41. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 202-49 and accompanying text.
43. Reynolds went forward with his initiative because he was afraid one of the
competing measures would supersede A.B. 971. The competing bills could have re-
placed A.B. 971 if they received Wilson's subsequent signature, but such an occur-
rence was improbable. Another reason Reynolds pushed forward was to make it
more difficult to "water down" the legislation with subsequent amendments. See
Dana Wilkie, Senate OKs Tough '3 Strikes', SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 4, 1994,
at Al. The initiative expressly provided for legislative amendment, but only by a
two-thirds majority in each house. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(c) (prohibiting legis-
lative amendments to a voter initiative unless the amendment itself is approved by
the voters, or the original initiative provides otherwise); CAL. PENAL Code § 667 (j)
(West Supp. 1977). Relying on the initiative process, however, did not bolster the
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quiring a supermajority for amendment of "three strikes" almost
guaranteed that future reform efforts would fail.44 This Article ar-
gues that Romero was faithful to both precedent and principle, and
that by following principle the court has given California the oppor-
tunity to correct its excesses.4 ' Rather than frustrating democracy,
the court has given the legislature an opportunity to bring rationality
back to California's sentencing policy.
II. "THREE STRIKES" BECOMES LAW
On June 29, 1992, convicted felon Joe Davis tried to grab Kim-
ber Reynolds's purse.47 In the words of her father, Fresno photogra-
pher Mike Reynolds, "[s]he resisted, but not that much. It wasn't a
big struggle. He pulled a .357 magnum out of his waistband, stuck it
in her ear and Xulled the trigger."" Kimber Reynolds died twenty-
six hours later.
Shortly after the murder, Mike Reynolds told Governor Pete
Wilson, "I'm going after these guys in a big way, the kind of people
who would murder little girls in this way." 50 Reynolds could not
have imagined what an effect he would have on California and the
nation.1
immunity of "three strikes" to subsequent amendment because A.B. 971 already
contained a provision which prohibited amendments except by a two-thirds vote by
the legislature. See id.
44. Subsection 667(j) of the California Penal Code limits the legislature's ability
to correct the law's excesses as it requires that all amendments be supported by a
two-thirds vote of each house. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j). As long as crime re-
mains an important political issue, few politicians will be able to urge reform. Secur-
ing a two-thirds majority in the Republican-controlled Assembly is highly unlikely.
Even in the Senate, where Democrats are still in the majority, reform is dubious.
Democrats do not have the requisite votes without some Republican support. Of
course, this assumes that all Democrats would vote for reform, an unlikely assump-
tion.
45. See infra notes 322-78 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 356-78 and accompanying text.
47. See Skelton, supra note 1, at A3.
48. Id. Joe Davis shot and killed Kimber Reynolds in front of at least 24 wit-
nesses. See id.
49. See id.
50. Morain, supra note 6, at Al.
51. Since 1993 at least 23 states have either enacted "three-strikes" statutes or
have amended existing habitual offender statutes to require harsher punishment and
less leniency for defendants. For a list of the habitual offender statutes enacted since
1993, see Vitiello, supra note 2, app. A.
What distinguishes California from other states is the legislation's severe sen-
tencing scheme and denial of judicial discretion. Although the Romero decision re-
stored some of the judiciary's sentencing discretion, the fact that California's "three-
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Reynolds solicited the assistance of James Ardaiz, the presiding
justice for the California Fifth District Court of Appeal, in drafting
the original "three-strikes" legislation.52 In 1993 Reynolds prevailed
on Bill Jones, then a Republican assemblyman from Fresno, to
sponsor Assembly Bill 971 (A.B. 971). 53 Jones enlisted Democratic
Assemblyman Jim Costa for support in the then Democratically
controlled legislature.-
On April 20, 1993, Reynolds and four busloads of supporters
showed up for the first hearing on the bill before the Assembly Pub-
lic Safety Committee.5 5 After Reynolds's impassioned plea for
stiffer sanctions for habitual offenders, the Committee soundly de-
feated the bill. 6 The Assembly's inaction forced Reynolds to turn to
strikes" provision is triggered by any third felony-violent or nonviolent-makes it
one of the most extreme laws of its kind. See id. at nn.25-36.
52. See Morain, supra note 16, at A3. Two other Fresno Municipal Court judges
cooperated with Judge Ardaiz in drafting an initial outline of the "three-strikes"
measure. See id. While it would appear that Mike Reynolds would have wanted to
use judicial authorship as a selling point, he did not reveal the authors until October
1994. See Dan Morain, Sponsor Says Judges Helped Write '3 Strikes', L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1994, at A3. During a debate in San Francisco, Reynolds was challenged to
reveal the identity of the authors of "three strikes." See id. Vincent Schiraldi, the
director of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice in San Francisco and an out-
spoken critic of "three strikes," made an unfounded accusation that the National Ri-
fle Association (NRA) had authored the bill. See id. In response, Reynolds said,
"I'm going to tell you who was responsible for this.... They were judges that did
the actual pen to paper, the initial draft." Id. Reynolds also said that the measure
was then circulated among deputies in the state Attorney General's office. See id.
Reynolds refused to name the judges and stated that the judges had requested ano-
nymity. See id. The reason they wanted to remain anonymous, according to Rey-
nolds, was because they may need to "rule on a 'three strikes' case and they didn't
want to [be] placed in a position of partiality." Id.
Judge Ardaiz admitted his involvement in response to the publicity over the
drafting and sharp criticism from other judges, who suggested that the judicial canon
of ethics required coming forward. See Morain, supra note 16, at A3. Questions
were raised on whether participation in drafting legislation was violative of the judi-
cial responsibility to forego the practice of law. See id. One appellate justice criti-
cized Ardaiz's involvement as "being very pro-law enforcement." Id. The judge also
received criticism from Catherine Campbell, the organizer of a May 1994 forum on
"three strikes," on which Ardaiz was a panelist. She described Ardaiz as an
"outright advocate" of the measure, but the judge responded that nothing he said
amounted to an endorsement. Id. Ardaiz further stated that he had intended to re-
cuse himself from appeals involving "substantive" legal questions regarding the
measure. See id. In defense of his action of drafting "three strikes," Ardaiz said
only, "I want to see [California] be a better place to live." Id.
53. See Phil Wyman & John G. Schmidt, Jr., Three Strikes You're Out (It's About
Time), 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 249,253 (1995).
54. See id.
55. See Morain, supra note 6, at Al.
56. See id.
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the initiative process to bypass the legislature.5
Qualifying an initiative is no mean feat, requiring collection of
nearly 385,000 signatures.5 ' Reynolds received financial support
from the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the California Cor-
rectional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA).59 Even with that
backing, Reynolds could not have succeeded but for Polly Klaas's
kidnapping on October 1, 1993.6
Before Polly's death was discovered, the efforts of her family to
locate her galvanized the nation. Her parents were able to human-
ize Polly by getting a videotape of her into the public spotlight. 1
They formed the Polly Klaas Foundation to keep her in the public
eye. 2 That organization was able to channel efforts of innumerable
volunteers.63
Millions of Californians were outraged when they learned that
her admitted killer, Richard Allen Davis, was a repeat offender.6
4
That fact may have assured passage of "three strikes." 65
Shortly after Polly's murder was discovered, Reynolds showed
57. See id. In disgust, Reynolds stated: "They figured they'd listen to me, pat me
on the head, say, 'I'm sorry about your daughter,' and send me home." Id.
58. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 8(b) (requiring signatures equal in number to 5% of
the "votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election" to cer-
tify a petition for placement on the ballot).
59. See Tupper Hull, A Father's Crusade to Lock Up Criminals, S.F. EXAMINER,
Dec. 8, 1993, at Al. Reynolds also reportedly placed his life savings of $60,000 in the
"Three Strikes and You're Out" kitty. See Amy Wallace, Unz TV Ad Says Wilson
Failed L.A. During Riots, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994, at A3; Dana Wilkie, Three
Strikes and You're Out: Felons Face a Hardened Public Attitude, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Feb. 6, 1994, at Al. Reynolds's personal investment was augmented originally
by a $40,000 donation from the NRA. See Hull, supra, at Al. Prior to the murder of
Polly Klaas, the most significant other financial support came from the CCPOA,
which made a $51,000 donation. See id.
60. See Heft, supra note 7, at 27.
61. See John Carman, Why Polly Was So Special, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 9,
1993, at A19.
62. See id.
63. See id. Having responded immediately after Polly's abduction by getting
videotape of her into the public spotlight, her parents prevented Polly from becom-
ing just another girl on a milk carton. See id Their strategy was to saturate our liv-
ing rooms with Polly's youthful charm. See id. The volunteer efforts of the Founda-
tion were successful by all accounts, except in the final result. See id.
64. See supra note 5.
65. California State Senator Phil Wyman contended that but for Polly Klaas's
murder by Richard Allen Davis-a recidivist by all counts-the Assembly Public
Safety Committee, described by Senator Wyman as the "graveyard of criminal jus-
tice bills," would have let the "three-strikes" measure die. See Wyman & Schmidt,
supra note 53, at 253 n.22.
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up at the Polly Klaas Foundation with ballot petitions.6 He intro-
duced himself to Marc Klaas, Polly's father, as "the father of a mur-
dered daughter."6 7 Klaas immediately signed the petition and, for a
time, joined Reynolds's campaign." It was not lost on Klaas or the
public that, had "three strikes" been in place when Davis committed
his last felony, he would have been in prison at the time of Polly's
murder.69
Despite weeks of campaigning, Reynolds had collected only
20,000 signatures for the initiative prior to the news of Polly's
death.70  Within days of the reports of her murder, "three-strikes"
supporters had gathered 50,000 signatures and the initiative was on
its way to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in Califor-
nia history.1
A. Reynolds's Sway with the Legislature and Governor
After Polly Klaas's death, Reynolds's reception in the legisla-
ture was decidedly different from the response only months earlier.
The Klaas murder and public perception that crime was on the rise
created overwhelming popular support for tough anticrime legisla-
72tion. Reynolds gave the legislature a choice: pass A.B. 971 or the
voters will do it for you. In an election year, Reynolds had the legis-
66. See Peter Hecht, Two Grieving Fathers Part Ways on '3 Strikes' Crusade,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 10, 1994, at Al.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. The media fanned the political flame by accusing politicians of having failed
the electorate in refusing to pass the "three-strikes" measure proposed by Mike
Reynolds in 1993. Talk show hosts proclaimed that "'the blood of Polly Klaas' is on
the hands of the committee members [who killed the bill]." Eric Bailey, Assembly
Public Safety Committee Turns Tough, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at A3.
70. See Heft, supra note 7, at 27.
71. See id
72. The coordination of Reynolds's efforts and Polly Klaas's death led to a tone
decidedly different from that of the politicians who had only months before rejected
A.B. 971. Bruce Cain, a University of California, Berkeley professor who specializes
in California politics, described the upturn for "three strikes." He said: "A dramatic
event has to coincide with a huge consensus out there. There was a big consensus.
Remember, we're in an election year. That is going to quicken the pace of any idea.
It's a matter of timing." Morain, supra note 6, at Al. The mixture of Polly Klaas's
murder, public perception that crime was on the rise, and election year rhetoric was
the potion that Mike Reynolds and his backers used to put the legislature under a
spell. Mike Reynolds harnessed the fears and frustration of an electorate ready for a
widespread overhaul of politics-as-usual and at once became California's new guru
of criminal justice policy.
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lature's attention.73
Prior to the passage of A.B. 971, a variety of observers with
widely different political agendas highlighted the bill's drafting
flaws. Reynolds, however, refused to allow amendments to the bill.
Further, Reynolds's sway with the legislature was almost unprece-
dented. As one commentator observed, '"[t]o argue against a policy
position offered by [Reynolds] is somehow taken to be a denial of
the legitimacy of [his] pain."' s Reynolds was especially adept in
using the press to intimidate those who raised questions about the
legislation. Reynolds's judgment that a politician was soft on crime
promised to be devastating. 6
A number of legislators presented alternative proposals to A.B.
971.n Reynolds's own advisers suggested revisions of A.B. 971 that
would have narrowed the legislation to target only violent offend-
ers.78 Law enforcement officials gave Reynolds a list of what they
73. See Dan Walters, Politicos Fail to Do It Right, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 13,
1994, at A3 (stating that legislators were in a "panicky rush to do exactly what Rey-
nolds wanted").
74. See Ken Chavez, Victims' Kin Rally at Capitol, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 5,
1994, at Al. Despite knowledge that A.B. 971 contained flaws that could be consid-
ered as only embarrassing drafting errors, Reynolds refused to allow any amend-
ments whatsoever. See id. Reynolds stated that "[w]e are not going to allow politi-
cians to take this life-and-death issue and turn it into a political football just because
it is an election year and they want to get re-elected." Id.
After A.B. 971 was amended to conform with the language of the initiative, it
underwent only one further significant amendment. This amendment codified A.B.
971 provisions as subdivisions (b) through (i) of section 667, rather than as a new
section. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 505, 917 P.2d 628,
630, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 791 (1996).
75. Daniel M. Weintraub, Lone Justice, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1995, at El (quoting
L. Paul Sutton, Professor of Criminal Justice Administration, San Diego State Uni-
versity).
76. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
77. The alternative proposals were A.B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1994) (A.B. 1568); A.B. 167 (Umberg), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) (A.B.
167); A.B. 2429 (Johnson), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) (A.B. 2429); and
A.B.X1 9 (Johnson), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) (A.B.X1 9). In the wake of
tragedies like that of Polly Klaas and Kimber Reynolds, revision of current sentenc-
ing laws was appropriate for debate. Most of the legislators who proposed "three-
strikes" legislation, however, had an added incentive because of the upcoming elec-
tion. Bill Jones was poised to become California's next Secretary of State. See Dana
Wilkie, Is It Fame? With Three Strikes at Issue, Two Key Dads Are on the Outs, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 13, 1994, at A3. Jim Costa was preparing to exit the As-
sembly for a state senatorship. See id. Tom Umberg was preparing to run for Attor-
ney General against Dan Lungren. See id. Finally, Republican Richard Rainey, a
former sheriff, was running for higher office at the time. See Rick Del Vecchio et al.,
Term-Limit Law Reshuffles State Ballot, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 30, 1995, at Al.
78. See James Richardson, 'Three Strikes' Supporters Divided, SACRAMENTO
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considered flaws in the proposed initiative." Reynolds, however,
was unrelenting. Even after the legislature passed the bill, he feared
that lawmakers would undermine it."0 As a result, he reneged on an
earlier promise to abandon the initiative process if A.B. 971 became
law.
81
Reynolds's sway with the legislature is a political anomaly. 2 He
had a unique ability to reach the press with a perfect sound bite that
threatened to destroy any politician who stood in his way. The three
simple words were "soft on crime. ''
Reynolds demonstrated his power at the final Senate Commit-
tee hearing before passage of A.B. 971. After state fiscal analysts
BEE, Feb. 12, 1994, at A4.
79. See id. (reporting law enforcement's concern that "three strikes" did not con-
tain a life without parole provision and that possibly "three strikes" "superseded the
death penalty"); see also SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 18,
at 7-8 (indicating the concern of critics that "three strikes" poses a cruel and unusual
punishment problem); CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY COMM. ANALYSIS OF
A.B. 1568, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Jan. 6, 1994) (visited Mar. 15, 1997)
<http:lwww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/billlasmab_1551-1600/ab_1568_cfa_940120
_134410_asmcomm> [hereinafter ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B.
1568] (indicating that the California District Attorneys Association supported an al-
ternative to "three strikes"); Bill Ainsworth, Why DAs Don't Like 'Three Strikes',
RECORDER (San Francisco), Jan. 18, 1994, at 1 (indicating that some critics perceived
an equal protection problem in "three strikes").
80. See Dan Morain, 'Three Strikes' Bill Clears State Legislature, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1994, at Al.
81. See id. Even after the Legislature passed A.B. 971 and Governor Wilson
signed it into law, Reynolds was distrustful of the politicians who voted for "three
strikes." See id. Reynolds feared that lawmakers would undermine the Jones/Costa
version of "three strikes." See id. Reynolds stated that the legislators had held the
four alternative bills "like a trump card. They've forced our hand." Id. Because of
his fear, he rescinded his promise to abandon the initiative process. See id. He
wanted to put the nail in the coffin for any challenger bill. He remarked that his vic-
tory was a "house of straw, easily changed or dismantled." Dana Wilkie, Prop. 184:
'3 Strikes' Already on Books, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 12, 1994, at Al. He
wanted to send a message to lawmakers that attempts to change his bill would be
political suicide. See id.
82. L. Paul Sutton, Professor of Criminal Justice Administration at San Diego
State University, described the phenomenon of someone like Mike Reynolds:
Everybody wants to hear what these people have to say, as if somehow the
misfortune they suffered makes them some sort of messiah .... To argue
against a policy position offered by a victim is somehow taken to be a de-
nial of the legitimacy of their pain. Nobody wants to be seen in that light.
Weintraub, supra note 75, at El.
83. Prior to passage of A.B. 971, Assemblyman Phil Isenberg (D.-Sacramento)
addressed the issue of politicians' fears of voting against "three strikes." See Dan
Walters, Few Challenge Speeding Train, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 1, 1994, at A3.
"We so fear the voters," he said, "we are afraid to talk openly." Id. One reporter
noted that "[t]he popular fear of crime is matched only by the fear of politicians that
they will be accused of softness in their approach." Id.
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had projected that A.B. 971 would cost California billions of dollars,
the Committee amended the bill to allocate some funds for crime
prevention. 4 Reynolds arose from the audience and stated: "When
we start adding amendments... it's going to open a Pandora's box..
. It will also demonstrate to me at least the inability of the Legisla-
ture to act in a responsible way." 5 He reminded the Committee of
the upcoming elections.86 One senator objected to what he termed a
"threat," but minutes later the amendment was repealedY Senator
Quentin Kopp remarked on the failure of his colleagues to exercise
their authority despite Reynolds's objections, "They feel threatened
in an election year and they're afraid of being denounced as trying
to subvert his initiative.
8 8
Reynolds distrusted not only legislators but also prosecutors
and criminal justice experts who argued in favor of a more focused
bill. Even though Reynolds's goal was to keep violent criminals
locked up, he would not listen to advisers who told him that revi-
sions would ensure that violent felons would be the target of the
bill. 9 Even Bill Jones, one of the bill's sponsors, insinuated that
A.B. 971 had room for improvement." Reynolds rejected a list of
suggestions from law enforcement officials who identified flaws in
the original bill.9' As observed by Marc Klaas, "[w]hat's driving
Mike is his passion.... Mike doesn't want to be reasoned with."
9
2
The eventual split between Klaas and Reynolds demonstrated
Reynolds's enormous power. As developed below, various legisla-
tors proposed alternatives to "three strikes."93 After studying the al-
ternatives, Klaas withdrew support for A.B. 971 because it put too
many nonviolent criminals behind bars.94 As Klaas stated, "[i]n the
depth of despair which all Californians shared with my family im-
mediately following Polly's murder, we blindly supported the
[Reynolds] initiative in the mistaken belief that it dealt only with




88. Hecht, supra note 66, at Al.
89. See Richardson, supra note 78, at A4.
90. See Morain, supra note 6, at Al.
91. See Richardson, supra note 78, at A4.
92. Dan Morain, 'Three Strikes': A Steamroller Driven by One Man's Pain, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A3.
93. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
94. See Heft, supra note 7, at 27.
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violent crimes. ' 5
Despite the role of Polly's death in generating public support
for "three strikes," Klaas's defection had little impact. By then,
Reynolds had obtained sufficient signatures to place the initiative on
the ballot.96 He had also enlisted the support of prominent politi-
cians, including Governor Pete Wilson, both major Democratic gu-
bernatorial candidates, and the Attorney General." Reynolds dis-
missed Klaas's stated concerns with the potentially staggering costs
of "three strikes" and questioned his motives.98
Reynolds was not the only "three strikes" proponent unwilling
to compromise. Governor Wilson used the occasion of Polly Klaas's
funeral to make a political speech, announcing his support for "three
strikes."' Even after its flaws became apparent, but during a diffi-
cult reelection campaign, Wilson resisted compromise in order to
preserve his position as the candidate toughest on crime.' His un-
yielding attitude is reflected in the following anecdote: According to
Klaas, Wilson indicated at Polly's funeral that he would support a
number of the alternative bills.'0 When Klaas switched his position,
he called the Governor to solicit support for Assembly Bill 1568
(A.B. 1568), a narrower proposal supported by Assemblyman Rich-
ard Rainey.'2 By then, Wilson was fully committed to Reynolds's
95. Lou Cannon, A Dark Side to 3-Strikes Laws, WASH. PoST, June 20, 1994, at
A15.
96. Mike Reynolds had gathered the requisite number of signatures necessary to
qualify the initiative for the November 8, 1994, general election by early April of
that year. See Memorandum from Elections Division, Office of the Secretary of
State, State of California, to All County Clerks/Registrars of Voters (94089) (Apr. 6,
1994) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
97. See Dan Morain, Lawmakers Jump on '3 Strikes' Bandwagon, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1994, at A3.
98. Reynolds was surprised by Klaas's challenge to his bill, and he responded as
other victims groups did by questioning Marc Klaas's motives. See Bill Ainsworth,
'Three Strikes' Spokesman Has Change of Heart, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at 7.
Reynolds's public comments about Marc Klaas ranged from benign to venomous.
See id. Reynolds realized that the strength of his support was severely diminished by
the loss of Klaas's support and speculated that Klaas had been "either lied to or
misinformed." Id. In contrast, Klaas was voicing legitimate debatable concerns.
"It's too expensive.... If you start taking money out of social programs, then you
aren't going to meet the goal of the Polly Klaas Foundation, which is to make
America safe for children." Id. That Klaas could consider the costs and alternate
proposals was laudable, but he was unable to convince Reynolds to enter into any
sort of meaningful debate regarding his bill or any other.
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bill and told Klaas that he would not support A.B. 1568 because he
"didn't know how the crime victims felt."1 3 Klaas responded, "I
don't think you remember who you're talking to.'
1 4
B. Other Political Players
A recent report by the National Criminal Justice Commission
(NCJC) identified several myths about violent crime that have in-
fluenced public policy for over a decade. 5 For example, the report
found that politicians and the media have misled the public into be-
lieving that crime rates and violent crime are soaring, despite con-
trary evidence."' The report identified the threat posed by groups
that benefit from the perception of a crime wave, such as the so-
called "prison-industrial complex," comprising groups which profit
from prison construction and maintenance. 7
A number of those groups were active supporters of Reynolds
and "three strikes." Among Reynolds's financial backers were the
California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), the
National Rifle Association, the California Gun Owners Association,
the Republican Party, and the campaign committees of Republican
senatorial candidate Michael Huffington and Governor Wilson.'
All of these entities had a political stake in the passage of "three
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 63-67
(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996). The NCJC report identified five myths concerning
crime which are demonstrably false, yet continue to have a profound impact on
criminal justice policy. See id. The five myths are: (1) Street crime is increasing-
street crime in fact dropped slightly in 1993 and 1994; (2) Street crime is more violent
today-the reality is that serious violent crime is 16% below the peak level of the
1970s; (3) More police officers are being killed-bulletproof vests have contributed to
a 50% drop in killings of law enforcement officers between 1973 and 1993; (4) Street
crime costs more than corporate crime-the Justice Department reported that in
1991, white-collar crime cost 7 to 25 times as much as street crime; and (5) Criminals
are different from the rest of us-many citizens have in fact committed a crime pun-
ishable by a sentence in jail, such as drunk driving or filing a false expense report.
See id.
106. See id. at 68-98 (discussing the myriad factors that artificially inflate the pub-
lic's fear of crime despite empirical data reflecting the opposite).
107. See id. at 85-98. Alarming is that government spending on crime control has
increased at more than twice the rate of defense spending. See id. at 85.
108. See Bill Ainsworth, A Marriage of Convenience, RECORDER (San Francisco),
Nov. 30, 1994, at 1; Wilkie, supra note 81, at Al. Notably, Michael Huffington's do-
nation made him a co-chair of the Three Strikes You're Out Committee. See Pamela
J. Podger, 'Three Strikes' Campaign Leaves Ballot Organizers $200,000 in the Hole,
FRESNO BEE, Nov. 29, 1994, at Bi.
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strikes" but none so large as that of the CCPOA.
CCPOA has become one of the most powerful lobbying groups
in Sacramento during the tenure of its president Don Novey. Be-
tween 1985 and 1990 the number of California prison guards nearly
doubled from 7570 to 14,249.' 9 By 1994 the increase was threefold,
to 22,547."0 Not only are there more guards, but they are well paid.
A prison guard with only a high school diploma and six years of ex-
perience earns $45,000 a year."' Wages for California guards are
fifty-eight percent higher than those of their counterparts in other
states.12  "Three strikes," therefore, represents a bonanza for
CCPOA.
Through strategic alliances, Don Novey has influenced law-
makers to favor his union. For example, the CCPOA contributed a
total of $1.4 million to Pete Wilson's 1990 and 1994 gubernatorial
campaigns."' After his election in 1990, Wilson launched the most
expensive prison construction plan any state has ever undertaken."'
CCPOA has also had close associations with victims' lobby
groups. In 1990 CCPOA provided funds to Harriet Salarno, a vic-
tims' rights activist, to protest the release of her daughter's killer."'
The following year Salarno and Novey agreed that his organization
would fund a victims' lobbying organization and victims' political
action committee."6 CCPOA has transformed various victims'
groups from a fringe movement into a political force."7 In 1994 vic-
tims' groups contributed to the passage of 102 bills that increased
prison sentences for convicted criminals."'




112 See CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRADING BOOKS FOR
BARS: THE LOPSIDED FUNDING BATTLE BETWEEN PRISONS AND UNIVERSITIES
(1994).
113. See Ainsworth, supra note 108, at 1.
114. See W. John Moore, Locked in, 26 NAT'L J. 1784, 1788 (1994).
115. See Ainsworth, supra note 108, at 1.
116. See id. Salarno was Wilson's controversial 1995 appointment to the Com-
mission on Judicial Performance. See Harriet Chiang, Judges Fear Review Panel
Partisanship, S.F. CHRON., May 24, 1995, at Al. This committee is supposed to pro-
vide impartial review of judicial misconduct, and judges have been vocal in criticizing
Salarno's appointment because of her agenda. See id.
117. See Ainsworth, supra note 108, at 1 (stating that the CCPOA has contributed
over $1 million to victims' rights groups since 1986, excluding pro bono lobbying and
one-dollar annual rent for office space to the Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau).
118. See id
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CCPOA has wielded political power by targeting politicians
who challenge its agenda. The organization targeted Assembly
Ways and Means Chairman John Vasconcellos for defeat after he
failed to support its position on prison bonds. 9 Although Vascon-
cellos prevailed, he learned a hard lesson from the experience: "I
have no desire to get into another fight with Don Novey.... It was
obvious that they spent an inordinate amount of money in an at-
tempt to unseat me.... I'm not about to fan the embers." 0
CCPOA was more successful in its bid to unseat Assemblyman
Bob Epple, who headed the Assembly Public Safety Committee.
CCPOA opposed Epple even though he supported most of its bills;
it opposed him because CCPOA's leaders believed that he was or-
chestrating hearings to defeat its bills.
121
CCPOA demonstrated similar power politics during the "three-
strikes" campaign. For example, when Los Angeles District Attor-
ney Gil Garcetti supported Rainey's A.B. 1568, a CCPOA lobbyist
reminded Garcetti that a CCPOA endorsement was crucial to his
reelection and that the CCPOA would oppose him unless he sup-
ported "three strikes."' The lobbyist suggested that Garcetti would
suffer when he refused to switch his support.2
C. The Legislature's Knowledge of A.B. 971's Flaws
California politicians cannot claim surprise about A.B. 971's
flaws. The Senate Judiciary Committee prepared an analysis dem-
onstrating some of the bill's more serious flaws. 24 Legislators also
had available detailed reports of the comparative merits of various
competing "three-strikes" measures.'25
119. See Craig Marine, Up from 'The Hole', S.F. EXAMINER, June 26, 1994, at B4.
120. Id.
121. See Ainsworth, supra note 108, at 1.
122. See id.
123. See id. It is not surprising that the CCPOA wanted to silence a high profile
district attorney like Garcetti as the CCPOA stood to gain 49,218 additional jobs
from "three strikes" in the next 35 years--compared to only 14,391 in the same pe-
riod under the Rainey bill. See id.
124. See SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OFA.B. 971, supra note 18, at 4-12.
125. For example, the Rainey bill, A.B. 1568, mandated a sentence of life impris-
onment without possibility of parole for defendants with a present conviction for a
"serious" felony and two prior convictions for "violent" felonies or for defendants
with a present conviction for a violent felony and two prior convictions for any com-
bination of serious or violent felonies. See A.B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess.
§ 2 (Cal. 1994). An indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 25 years was reserved
for defendants convicted of a third serious felony. See id. Defendants convicted of a
serious or violent felony with one prior violent conviction would have had their sen-
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Like other committees, the Senate Judiciary Committee was
aware of A.B. 971's excesses. 6 The Judiciary Committee knew, for
example, that "three strikes" might require imposition of a sentence
of twenty-five years to life in prison on a repeat felon who had never
committed a violent felony.27
Elsewhere in the legislature, the Assembly was unwilling to
tackle the financial problems posed by A.B. 971. In January, 1994,
the Assembly Ways and Means Committee approved all of the
"three-strikes" bills despite its failure to procure any final reports
outlining the cost of the legislation'2 and a preliminary Legislative
Analyst's Office report estimating the cost to be in the billions.
12 9
Despite serious questions about the cost of sentencing reform, the
tences doubled. See id.; see also SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra
note 18, at 8 (stating that "A.B. 971 ... call[s] for an indeterminate life sentence,
with a base of at least 25 years); CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY COMM.
ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 2-5 (Jan. 6, 1994) (visited Mar. 15, 1997)
<http:llwww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/asm/ab_0951-
1000/ab_971_cfa_940120._132758_asm_comm> (discussing the relevant provisions of
A.B. 1568).
126. See SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OFA.B. 971, supra note 18, at 4-11.
127. The Judiciary Committee's report specifically stated that A.B. 971 "would
make no distinction in severity [of sentencing] between different felonies." Id. at 4.
To further demonstrate consciousness of the harsh effects A.B. 971 would have upon
nonviolent or no longer violent offenders, the Committee provided the following ex-
amples:
[(1)] A person who was convicted of breaking into a neighbor's attached
garage on two occasions in order to steal a bicycle.., would have two seri-
ous prior offenses. Any third felony, such as theft of $400 worth of prop-
erty, would result in a life term ... regardless of whether or not he or she
had ever acted violently or dangerously[; and (2)] forgery of a $10 check,
petty theft with a prior, or possession of a stolen radio with two prior seri-
ous felonies would result in a life sentence.
Id.; see also Bill Jones, Three Strikes and You're Out, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 243,
245 (1995) ("[Opponents] are correct that this law will cast a broad net, but that is
certainly not an unintended provision. 'Three Strikes' is an anti-crime law, not just
an anti-violent crime law.").
In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee highlighted some of the ambigu-
ity in the statute and raised concerns about the constitutionality of the statute as
written. See SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 18, at 8 (noting
that "this bill appears to be constitutionally infirm in that it would require cruel and
unusual punishment in some cases, with no option for a lesser sentence in the inter-
est of justice").
12& See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY THIRD READING (A.B. 971), 1993-
1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Jan. 27, 1994) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY FLOOR (A.B. 971)] (failing
to provide a fiscal analysis, yet passing the measure).
129. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B.
971, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1 (Jan. 26, 1994) (visited Mar. 15, 1997) <http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/billasm/ab_0951-1000/ab_971_cfa_940128-155310_asm_
comm> (acknowledging the Legislative Analyst's Office cost projections); Dan Mo-
rain, Assembly Panel OKs Five '3 Strikes' Bills, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1994, at A3.
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Assembly approved all five "three-strikes" bills by the end of Janu-
ary, 1994, and sent them to the Senate without a fiscal analysis. 30
Three days before the Senate voted on A.B. 971, the California
Department of Corrections (CDC) distributed its report to key legis-
lators.13 ' The CDC projected that the legislation would add $5.7 bil-
lion per year in operating costs by fiscal year 2027-2028 and would
require twenty new prisons in addition to the twelve prisons already
planned for fiscal year 2003-2004 and the sixteen new prisons con-
structed during the past ten years.132 The total cost of construction
would be $21.3 billion.'33
The legislature failed to explain how it would finance the in-
creased costs. Later Governor Wilson stated that "[o]bviously, we
build prisons by passing [prison] bonds."' That solution may be il-
lusory; for example, in 1990 Californians defeated a proposed bond
issue of $450 million for prison bonds.13 1 While fear of crime has in-
creased since 1990, so too have the stakes in light of the $21 billion
estimate for the cost of prison construction alone.
D. Better Alternatives to A.B. 971
During passage of "three strikes," sounder alternatives were
readily available. 13W As legislators must have known, Reynolds's bill
130. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR (A.B. 971), supra note 128, at 2 (exemplifying the fail-
ure to include a fiscal analysis); Morain, supra note 129, at A3.
131. See Memorandum from Richard S. Welch, Chief, Offender Information
Services Branch, Department of Corrections, to James H. Gomez, Director of Cor-
rections 1 (Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Welch Memorandum] (on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
132. See id. at 9.
133. See id.; CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,supra note 112.
134. Gordon Smith, Crime Measure Seen as Pricey Proposition, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-TRIB., Oct. 16, 1994, at Al.
135. See John Hurst, Full Cells and Empty Pockets, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1991, at
Al; see also Jon Matthews, Wilson Still Pitching for 'Three Strikes' Law, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, Mar. 3, 1994, at Al (stating that Wilson believed that Californians
would be willing to bear the costs of "three strikes"). There has been further evi-
dence that the proposed bond financing may not work. In the June 1994 primary
election, voters rejected a bond measure for earthquake recovery, a proposal to buy
park land, a proposal to improve college campuses, and a proposal for public school
construction. See Virginia Ellis, Defeat of Quake Relief Bonds Adds to Budget Crisis,
L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at Al. Bruce Cain, Professor at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley stated that "[the election ... shows that bond measures, which were
the panacea of the '80s for public finance, are not going to be a panacea in the
1990s." Susan Yoachum & John Wildermuth, Californians Voted Against Spending,
Crime, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 1994, at Al.
136. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
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imposes severe sentences for petty criminals at an enormous ex-
pense to the public. In contrast, several of the alternatives struck a
more reasonable balance between tough sanctions and fiscal re-
sponsibility. Assemblyman Richard Rainey's A.B. 1568, for exam-
ple, carried the harshest sentences for the state's most serious of-. 137
fenders without the same financial consequences.
The Rainey bill provided life sentences for three-time felons,
with particularly harsh parole provisions reserved for those most
violent.38 The bill further mandated a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole in two instances: (1) a present convic-
tion for a "serious" felony with two prior convictions for "violent"
felonies; or (2) a present conviction for a violent felony with any
combination of prior serious or violent felony convictions.'39 The bill
also provided for indeterminate sentences, with a minimum of
twenty-five years, for defendants convicted of a third serious felony
or a conviction for a serious or violent felony and one violent fel-
140ony.
137. See CALIFORNIA SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971,
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS,
ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971] (implicitly admitting that lower costs would arise from resi-
dential burglary not being a qualifying prior as proposed by A.B. 1568); SENATE
JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 18, at 9-11. See generally PETER W.
GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: ESTIMATED
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY-SENTENCING LAW (1994)
(analyzing the cost of reducing crime rates using the "three-strikes" law and other
alternative measures).
138. See A.B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 1994).
139. See id. The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) and the Cali-
fornia State Sheriffs Association worked with Rainey to "fashion a bill which [was]
tighter, tougher, and more appropriately crafted" than A.B. 971. ASSEMBLY PUBLIC
SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568, supra note 79, at 2.
140. The Assembly Committee on Public Safety analysis provided the following
example contrasting A.B. 1568 with the voter initiative:
[A] first time rapist.., could be subject to the same eight years maximum
sentence as under current law. However, he would serve eight years due to
the provision of the bill which eliminates conduct ... credits. Under the
initiative he would serve approximately four years because it does not ef-
fect first time offender credits.
A second time rapist would be sentenced to 18 years under this bill, and
serve 18 years. Under the initiative he would serve fourteen and a half
years.
Finally, a third time rapist would be sentenced to life without possibility
of parole under this bill .... Under the initiative he would receive a life
sentence, eligible for parole after 20 years.
ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568, supra note 79, at 6.
The Rainey bill focused more carefully on serious and violent felons than did
"three strikes." Rainey's bill did not contain the myriad drafting flaws present in
A.B. 971. Rainey's bill quickly accumulated the support of legislators and various
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The Rainey bill promised to provide protection at a more real-
istic cost than would "three strikes." One obvious savings came
from the requirement that the third felony must be serious or violent
to trigger a long prison term,4 thereby eliminating the widely pub-
licized cases of defendants whose third felony is minor, such as drug
possession or petty theft.142 A.B. 1568 also did not include residen-
law enforcement organizations, and it proved to be the most viable alternative to
A.B. 971 and the Reynolds initiative. See Kevin Fagan, Call for Changes Fails to
Resonate in the East Bay Legislation Contests, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 1994, at 18.
141. See Cal. A.B. 1568 § 2.
142. See id. Several "three-strikes" cases decided before the California Supreme
Court decision in Romero yielded sentences that appear disproportionate to the trig-
gering felony. Ricky Valadez, for example, was sentenced to 25 years to life for
stealing a drill from a garage. See Rene Lynch & Anna Cekola, '3 Strikes' Law
Causes Juror Unease in 0. C., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al. With two prior bur-
glary convictions, including one dating back to the 1970s, his third minor felony
struck him out. See id. Jerry Dewayne Williams received a similar sentence for
stealing a slice of pizza-this third strike provided him with a 25-year bunk reserva-
tion in state prison. See Eric Slater, Pizza Thief Receives Sentence of 25 Years to Life
in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B9. Duane Silva, who has an IQ of 70 and
was previously convicted of setting trash barrels and a car's glove compartment on
fire, was sentenced to 30 years to life for stealing a neighbor's video recorder and
coin collection. See id. Billy Sharod, who had previous convictions for robbery and
petty theft, received a life sentence for selling $10 worth of rock cocaine to an under-
cover officer. See Anna Cekola, $10 Cocaine Sale Becomes 'Third Strike,' L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at B1.
This trend defined defendants convicted under "three strikes." During the
first eight months of the law, approximately 70% of all second- and third-strike de-
fendants were convicted of nonviolent and nonserious offenses. See DAVID
ESPARZA, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE
OUT" LAW-A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 8 (1995). The number of second- and
third-strike offenders convicted for nonviolent offenses soared to 85% after two
years of implementation of the law. See CHRISTOPHER DAVIS ET AL., CENTER ON
JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, "THREE STRIKES": THE NEW APARTHEID 2
(1996). Ironically, in the two years since the "three-strikes" law soared through the
legislature as a response to public fear and anger over violent crime, the law has led
to life imprisonment for 192 marijuana users who previously would have served little
or no time, while only 40 convicted murderers, 25 rapists, and 24 kidnappers have
received life sentences. See Giles Whittell, Small-Time Drug Crooks Clog California
Prisons, TIMES (London), Mar. 9, 1996, at 12 (citing figures released by the Califor-
nia Department of Corrections). As of January 1996, out of the 14,497 convicted
second-strike offenders, approximately 80% were committed to prison for a nonvio-
lent offense; furthermore, of the 1342 convicted third-strike offenders, approxi-
mately 62% were committed to prison for a nonviolent offense. See LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF THE "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT" LAW
ON CALIFORNIA'S JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1996).
The prosecutorial power under "three strikes" to impose such disproportion-
ate sentencing without regard to judicial opinion came to an end with the California
Supreme Court decision in People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917
P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996). At the age of 32, the time of his last offense,
Romero was convicted of his third felony. See People v. Superior Court (Romero),
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tial burglary among qualifying prior felonies. 43 One report has pro-
jected a savings of as much as seventy-five percent of the cost of
"three strikes" by that change alone.
144
E. A Failure of Political Courage
With alternative bills before them, legislators had the opportu-
nity to evaluate the economic impact of the "three-strikes" propos-
als. Despite what they learned, no influential politician took a lead-
ership role in favor of a more measured bill than "three strikes.'
45
On January 26, 1994, prior to passage of A.B. 971, the RAND
Corporation issued a disclaimer regarding the proposed legisla-
tion.'46 It specifically challenged the use of an earlier RAND study
to estimate the savings generated by incarcerating large numbers of
criminals. 47 "Three strikes" proponents had used the earlier RAND
study to estimate the average number of offenses committed by each
repeat offender, between 187 and 287 crimes per year. 14 Those es-timates distort the benefits gained by incarcerating each new, mar-
37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 371, 380 (Ct. App. 1995), affd in part, rev'd in part, 13 Cal. 4th
497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996). In the face of five prior nonviolent
felonies-burglary in the second degree in 1980, attempted burglary in the first de-
gree in 1984, burglary in the first degree in 1986, and possession of a controlled sub-
stance in 1992 and in 1993-the trial court judge refused to impose the harsh provi-
sions of "three strikes" and stated that the law "is a significant piece of Legislation
that basically castrates a judge." Id.
143. See Cal. A.B. 1568 § 2 (proposing to amend California Penal Code §
667.5(c)(1)-(22) by excluding residential burglary from the list of "violent felonies,"
which trigger the sentence enhancement provisions).
144. See Vincent Schiraldi, Corrections and Higher Ed Compete for California
Dollars; Corrections Winning, OVERCROWDED TIMES, June 1994, at 7, 7.
145. When asked whether he could have used his power to create rational debate,
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown responded: "'I got out of the way of this train be-
cause I am a realist."' Jerry Gillam, Legislators Fear Public on '3 Strikes,' Brown
Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1994, at A3. Brown, distancing himself from all of the
measures, said, "'Put everything on the governor's desk and let him deal with it....
And that's a pure, unadulterated, practical political approach."' Richardson, supra
note 78, at A4.
146. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971,
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Jan. 26, 1994) (visited Mar. 15, 1997) <http://www.leginfo.
ca.gov.pub93-94billlasrnab_0951-10001ab_971_cfa_940128_155310_asmcomm>
[hereinafter ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971].
147. In response to numerous studies citing that the average repeat offender
commits between 187 and 278 crimes per year at an average cost of $430,000, the
RAND Corporation provided a correction to "'the erroneous references to RAND
data and findings' related to the three-strikes debate." Id. In rebuttal to the cost of
crime, RAND stated: "There is, as yet, no commonly accepted framework for esti-
mating such costs.... RAND's studies contained no cost figures whatsoever." Id.
148. See id.
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ginal, repeat offender ' 49 because, as documented in a number of im-
portant studies, a small percentage of the criminal population
commits an extremely high number of offenses.' Hence, using the
average number of offenses per year-180-rather than the median
number of offenses per year-15-inflated the projected savings."'
Typical of the legislature's unwillingness to deal with the eco-
nomic realities of A.B. 971 was the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee's handling of the various bills. A month after the Ways and
Means Committee analysis was available, the Senate Committee
convened to discuss the fiscal impact of the various "three-strikes"
measures.5 2 The Committee had available the fiscal analysis of A.B.
971 but did not have similar projections for Rainey's or Umberg's
bills.153 Nevertheless, members of the Committee recognized that
residential burglary was not a strike under those measures and must
149. In response to proponents' use of the RAND study to estimate that the num-
ber of offenses the average repeat offender commits per year, RAND stated that
"[t]his figure was skewed by the fact that 10 percent of the group was extremely ac-
tive, committing more than 600 crimes apiece. The typical inmate-the median in
the distribution-reports having committed 15 crimes per year." Id. It is reasonable
to assume that high rate offenders are more likely to be arrested. Hence, dramatic
.increases in incarceration rates are likely to lead to incarceration of lower-rate of-
fenders. Therefore, the effect of the crime rate will not be constant. As low-rate of-
fenders are incarcerated, there will be less effect on overall crime rates.
150. See, for example, MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH
COHORT (1972), a widely cited study on offender crime rates, which reviewed rec-
ords of 9945 boys from their tenth through eighteenth birthdays. While approxi-
mately one-third had a record of involvement with police, 627 boys had five or more
arrests during those years. See id. at 88. That small group committed over one-half
of the recorded delinquencies and two-thirds of the violent offenses. See id.; see also
MARK H. MOORE ET AL., DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE ELUSIVE TARGET OF
JUSTICE 38-39 (1984) (implying that a portion of high-rate offenders are so active-
committing more than 50 robberies per year-that incapacitation would be wholly
justified based on deterrence, rehabilitative, or retributivist theories of punishment).
See generally JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN
NATURE 24-26 (1985) (discussing patterns in criminality).
151. See ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OFA.B. 971, supra note 146, at 2.
152. See CALIFORNIA SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B.X1 9,
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1 (Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS,
ANALYSIS OF A.B.X1 9]; CALIFORNIA SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF
A.B. 167, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1 (Feb. 28, 1994), available in LEXIS, Cal Library,
Cacomm File [hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 167];
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 137, at 1; CALIFORNIA
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1
(Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568];
CALIFORNIA SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 2429, 1993-1994
Reg. Sess. 1 (Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF
A.B. 2429].
153. See Welch Memorandum, supra note 131, at 1-9.
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have known, therefore, that those bills would offer significant sav-
ings over A.B. 9 7 1.'-4 The Committee approved all of the measures
despite the estimated cost of A.B. 971.'55
Some legislators attempted to distance themselves from the
predicted future consequences of the measures. Senator Leroy
Greene's actions exemplified the unwillingness to fight the "three-
strikes" measures generally or A.B. 971 specifically. Greene did not
vote on the bills during the Appropriations Committee hearing be-
cause he was "not prepared to vote for a blank check."'56 Shortly
thereafter he changed his view, stating, "I'm going to vote for these
turkeys because constituents want me to."1 7 No doubt other sena-
tors bailed out as well; A.B. 971 passed on the floor vote by a
twenty-nine to seven margin.1
58
Even though A.B. 971 had strong political support, most impor-
tantly from Governor Wilson,"9 the lack of support for more care-
fully drafted alternatives is surprising. The lack of support is espe-
cially odd in light of political pressure in favor of alternatives,
particularly the Rainey bill, and against A.B. 971, brought by vari-
ous law enforcement groups immune from the "soft-on-crime" la-
bel.
60
The Rainey measure offered even tougher sentences for some
of the worst offenders and would have been far less expensive than
"three strikes."' 6' Legislators could have easily backed A.B. 1568 in-
154. See SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 167, supra note 152. The
Committee cited the CDC's estimate of the cost of incarceration under the "three-
strikes" initiative, stating that excluding burglary as a strike would cost "$22 million
in 1993-94, increasing annually to the year 2003-04, and $1.6 billion annually thereaf-
ter." Id. In comparison, the Committee noted that when burglary is included as a
prior strike, the costs amount to "$75 million in 1995-96, increasing annually with a
full-year fiscal impact in 2027-28 at $5.7 billion." Id.
155. See generally SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B.X1 9, supra note
152 (policy vote: 9-0); SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 167, supra note
152 (policy vote: 8-2); SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note
137 (policy vote: 8-3); SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568, supra note
152 (policy vote: 10-0); SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 2429, supra
note 152 (policy vote: 10-0).
156. Vlae Kershner, '3 Strikes' Initiative-A Vast, Expensive Plan, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 1, 1994, at Al.
157. Morain, supra note 80, at Al.
158. See id.
159. See Hecht, supra note 66, at Al.
160. See ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568, supra note 79, at 3
(indicating that the California District Attorneys Association and the California
Sheriffs Association supported the Rainey measure).
161. See SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 18, at 9-11;
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stead of A.B. 971 by arguing that the former was tougher on crime
and more fiscally responsible, two issues that predominated the
politics of 1994. 62 That did not happen for a number of reasons,
dealing largely with election year politics. Wilson was outspoken in
his support of Reynolds. Even before his chief economist produced
a methodolojically flawed report, grossly inflating the savings from
the initiative, 63 Wilson argued that the economic concerns of oppo-
nents of "three strikes" were overstated.6" Had Wilson distanced
himself from Reynolds or had Reynolds been willing to work with
Rainey, better legislation might have resulted.65
Frustrated with Wilson and Reynolds, Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown threatened that the legislature would approve all five bills
and "[p]ut everything on the governor's desk and let him deal with
GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 137, at xiii-xiv. See generally SENATE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 137 (implicitly admitting that lower
costs would result if residential burglary was not a qualifying prior).
162. Crime was a hot issue for the 1994 California gubernatorial race with 27% of
Californians saying it was the election's most important issue. See Bill Stall, Brown
Ads Target Job Losses, Crime, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A3 [hereinafter Stall, Ads
Target Losses]. Governor Wilson and the Republican Party quickly seized on the
crime issue making it the dominant theme of a three-day GOP convention in San
Francisco. See Bill Stall, GOP Pins '94 Hopes on Crime Issue, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1994, at A3 [hereinafter Stall, GOP Pins Hopes]. The Republican Party adopted a
"tough-on-crime" plank that was intended to propel Republicans to victories in the
state legislative elections as well as the gubernatorial race. See id.
Fiscal responsibility was another theme of the gubernatorial race. Governor
Wilson, regretting giving consent for a seven billion dollar tax increase in his first
year as governor, sought to portray himself in the campaign as a defender against tax
increases. See id. Both candidates, Wilson and Kathleen Brown, proposed various
solutions to the state's debt, such as Brown's suggestion of a one-time issuance of
bonds, and Wilson's suggestion of a demand of reimbursement from the federal gov-
ernment for the expenses California incurred in incarcerating illegal aliens. See Spe-
cial Guide to California's Elections: Governor's Race-The Issues, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1994, at W2. Both candidates treaded cautiously on the economic issue, which
36% of Californian voters considered to be the most important of the election. See
Stall, Ads Target Losses, supra, at A3.
163. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
164. Governor Wilson balked at any suggestion that the "three-strikes" bills
would not be economically feasible. See Matthews, supra note 135, at Al. Wilson
said, "There's really no dispute that these reforms will require considerable addi-
tional expense.... That is an expense, I submit, that the public is willing to pay....
We cannot afford not to pay." Id. Wilson also stated, "We're producing ... capital
improvements for future generations, and they rightly can be called upon to help pay
for it." Daniel M. Weintraub, '3 Strikes' Law Goes Into Effect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1994, at Al.
165. Brown stated, "If the three-strikes sponsors would come to the reality of the
defects in their measure, they probably would embrace the Rainey measure and that
would reach the governor's desk." Richardson, supra note 78, at A4.
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it. . . . And that's a pure, unadulterated, practical political ap-
proach. 166 The Assembly did just that.67
A similar strategy almost developed in the Senate that would
have forced Wilson to make the choice among competing alterna-
tives. Wilson wanted the legislature to combine competing meas-
ures, casting the "widest net," and he threatened to sign all of the
bills passed by the Senate, allowing the courts to determine which
law was in effect.'6 The drafters of the four alternatives to A.B. 971
added a provision automatically repealing the measure if any other
measure was subsequently enacted. 69 The provision would have
forced Wilson to decide which bill to sign last.
The Senate ultimately refrained from passing all of the bills si-
multaneously. Instead, the Senate delayed action on the four com-
petitors to A.B. 971, averting Wilson's need to make a choice.7 ' De-
spite the overwhelming support for A.B. 971, when the legislature
ultimately voted on it,' A.B. 971 passed in an atmosphere of politi-
cal distrust. Reynolds would neither compromise nor work with
Rainey on an alternative bill.12 In reaction to what he saw as the
unsavory nature of the political process and fearful that the legisla-
ture might later weaken A.B. 971, Reynolds pursued the initiative
process despite an earlier promise to the contrary.73
166. Id.
167. See Morain, supra note 129, at A3.
168. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Calls for Unified Crime Bill, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1994, at A3.
169. Section 9 of Rainey's bill, A.B. 1568, provides an example of the voiding
provision:
The provisions of this act shall become operative on April 1, 1994, unless ei-
ther Assembly Bill 167, Assembly Bill 971, or Assembly Bill 2429 of the
1993-94 Regular Session, or Assembly Bill 9 of the 1993-94 First Extraordi-
nary Session, or any combination thereof, are enacted after this act, in
which case this act shall not become operative.
A.B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 9 (Cal. 1994). For analogous provisions,
see A.B. 167 (Umberg), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 14 (Cal. 1994); A.B. 2429 (Johnson),
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Cal. 1994). The measures also contained provisions which
would void them if the voter initiative, Proposition 184, was passed by the voters in
November of that year. See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 1568 § 10.
170. See Morain, supra note 80, at Al. The other measures were sent to commit-
tee for possible incorporation into a future crime package. See id.
171. A.B. 971 passed through four committees and two floor votes in 59 days. See
Jones, supra note 127, at 244. The bill passed the Assembly by a vote of 63-9 and
passed the Senate by a vote of 29-7. See 1 ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 712 (Cal.Reg.
1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).
172. See Hecht, supra note 66, at Al (reporting Reynolds's refusal to allow
amendments).
173. See Wilkie, supra note 81, at Al.
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The Governor, who had highly politicized the crime issue, T7
cried foul often when the legislature questioned the fiscal soundness
of the bill and when it did not combine the bills into a single, even
tougher bill.'75 Senator Lockyer wanted to revisit the alternatives
once A.B. 971 had been passed.76  Reynolds asked Assembly
Speaker Brown to use his leadership to improve on the law with
elements of Rainey's bill. But Brown smelled a political rat and was
convinced this was a ploy to attack Democrats for trying to weaken
the law during the election campaign.' 77 Few in the legislature were
willing to take on Reynolds or Wilson, who would have portrayed
opponents as soft on crime, a tough label to wear in 1994. The irony
was that legislators like Rainey were in some ways tougher on crime
than Reynolds, and certainly more fiscally responsible.
F A "Spectacular" Savings for California
Even after the legislature passed A.B. 971, Democrats were un-
successful in minimizing crime as an election issue. Republicans
stood to gain by placing "three strikes" in the election spotlight.179
174. Governor Wilson strengthened his position as the "tough-on-crime" candi-
date by holding a two-day crime summit in Hollywood, California, which was at-
tended by over 1000 state politicians, crime victims, and law enforcement officials.
See Dan Morain & Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Crime Summit to Have Hard-Line
Focus, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at A28.
175. See Weintraub, supra note 168, at A3. Wilson attacked the senate for failing
to combine the "toughest provisions" of each of the competing bills. See id. He said:
"We have the opportunity to give the public all the protection it needs .... We
shouldn't play political games." Id.
176. Bill Lockyer stated, "Maybe when [the Jones/Costa bill] is behind us, we can
move on to a more comprehensive discussion of crime in a less impassioned or less
political atmosphere." Morain, supra note 80, at Al (also reporting that Lockyer
voted for A.B. 971 even though he opposed much of its content).
177. See James Richardson, Brown Won't Touch "3 Strikes" This Year,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 16, 1994, at A4. When asked if he would respond to Rey-
nolds's request to craft a better bill, the Speaker stated:
Mr. Reynolds is not going to run me out there on that tree and saw it.... I
know exactly what Mr. Reynolds and people like that would like to do.
They have a measure on the ballot in the fall, and they absolutely need to
have that to try to defeat [United States Senator] Dianne Feinstein and to
get Wilson a leg up.
Id.
178. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
179. See Morain, supra note 92, at A3. The report stated that Michael Huffington
was the largest contributor to the YES on 184 Committee with a donation of
$350,000. See id. According to a consultant to the committee, Huffington "'wanted
very much to use it as a campaign issue."' Id. (quoting Charles Cavalier, political
consultant for Mike Reynolds and Proposition 184).
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Wilson, involved in a tough race, used crime as a campaign issue.8 '
After Wilson signed A.B. 971 into law, his chief economist, Philip
Romero, issued a report arguing that "three strikes" would save
California billions of dollars."" The report contended that the public
debate over the cost of "three strikes" was one-sided. Romero
claimed to balance the debate by fully discussing the benefits that
"three strikes" would generate.1
Romero calculated the benefits of the law by quantifying (1)
crime victims' direct out-of-pocket costs; (2) lost earnings and pain
and suffering; and (3) savings in costs associated with prevention of
crime, no longer necessary because "three strikes" would prevent
the crimes in the first instance.'3 Romero was correct-both when
he recognized that the latter two categories are "softer" figures and
that, nevertheless, both have real value.' 4
Without acknowledging important methodological questions
about a RAND Corporation study from the early 1980s5" Romero
relied on self-reports by prison inmates concerning the number of
crimes committed when the incarcerated offender was on the
street.186 Despite a median of only fifteen reported crimes per of-
fender, Romero based his calculations on a "highly conservative"
estimate that each offender incarcerated as a result of "three
strikes" would otherwise commit between 20 and 150 crimes per
year.' The RAND report, consistent with other studies, indicated
that some offenders commit in excess of 600 offenses per year,
making the average far greater than the median of fifteen crimes per
year.
180. See Weintraub, supra note 168, at A3.
181. See PHILIP J. ROMERO, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, How INCARCERATING MORE FELONS WILL BENEFIT
CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY 2-5 (1994).
182 See id. at 2-4.
183. See id. at 2.
184. See id. at 3. There is a certain irony to Governor Wilson's reliance on pain
and suffering as a measure of the cost of crime. In 1992 the Governor, along with a
coalition of business and medical groups, attempted to extend the limits on pain and
suffering under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 to all civil li-
ability cases. See Philip Hager, Civil Liability System Faces Uncivil War, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1992, at A3.
185. For a discussion of methodological problems with a survey like the RAND
Study, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 80-86 (1995).
186. See ROMERO, supra note 181, at 2.
187. See id.
188. RAND data reports that the average repeat offender commits between 187
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Romero also relied on estimated savings in unnecessary security
services rendered obsolete if crimes were not committed. Admitting
that the figures were arbitrary, Romero used a range of between
twenty-five to seventy-five percent in reduction of actual spending
on crime prevention.'' He estimated upper and lower ranges based
on estimates that between 20 and 150 crimes would be prevented
and that society would reduce the amount spent on security meas-
ures between twenty-five and seventy-five percent.'" The savings,
he said, would range from $137,000 to $515,000.91
The report concluded that a reasonable estimate of savings to
society would be between $200,000 and $300,000 for each year an of-
fender was incarcerated, adding up to a total benefit of $29 billion
by the year 2000.192 The savings in 2028 alone were projected to be
$54 billion.'93 These figures, Romero asserted, were based on con-
servative estimates and represented minimum social benefits to be
realized as a result of "three strikes." His estimates were far in ex-
and 278 crimes per year. See ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, su-
pra note 146, at 2. Extremely active offenders, however, composing approximately
10% of the group, commit more than 600 crimes apiece. See id.
189. See ROMERO, supra note 181, at 2.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 3. To calculate the savings for crimes avoided, Romero looked at
the fraction of a single crime's share of crime prevention costs that would be actually
avoided. See id. at 3, 6. The study admittedly chose an "arbitrar[y]" range of be-
tween 25% and 75% in actual spending reduction. See id. From this, Romero sur-
mised that if the upper range of 150 crimes were avoided, the social costs reduced
would be between $302,000 and $515,000. See id. If only 20 crimes were avoided,
the social costs reduced would be between $137,000 and $248,000. See id. at 3.
Romero legitimized his calculations by citing a 1990 study from the BOTEC Analysis
Corporation which reported a range of social costs reduced between $390,000 and
$2.8 million. See id. (citing BOTEC ANALYSIS CORP., A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
PRISON CELL CONSTRUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS (1990)).
192. See id. at 5. In order to project the "savings," Romero merely took the Cali-
fornia Department of Corrections (CDC) figures for increased inmate years with
"three strikes" and multiplied it by $200,000. See id. at 4. Romero agreed with the
CDC that there would be in excess of 272,000 "three-strikes" inmates incarcerated in
2028. See id. at 5. Therefore, Romero projected a $54-billion savings. See id. The
costs in that year, amortizing the costs of capital construction, were just $6 billion.
See id. Therefore, California would receive a windfall of $48 billion in 2028, and for
every year thereafter. See id. The $29 billion figure was calculated adding the sav-
ings for the first five years of additional incarceration. See id. Romero projected
that the total costs for the first five years of "three strikes" would add up to $6 bil-
lion, thereby yielding a savings of $23 billion. See id. The Three Strikes Committee
used this figure in the voter pamphlet in part to show that trying this system out
could not hurt the state financially as opponents claimed. See California Ballot
Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 37.
193. See ROMERO, supra note 181, at 5.
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cess of the estimated cost of $6 billion. 194
Experts lambasted Romero's report.9 Wilson and the Three
Strikes You're Out Committee stuck by the report's claims. For ex-
ample, Wilson stated that the report "underscores the costs all of us
bear when crimes are committed: higher medical costs, higher in-
surance premiums, business flight, and the loss of choice about
where to work, live or shop because of fear of crime.," 19 6 Despite le-
gal challenges, the Three Strikes You're Out Committee succeeded
in including the claimed savings in the ballot pamphlet. 97
194. For costs, Romero relied on the CDC projections, but he assumed that the
costs would be amortized over 30 years through the use of bonds. See id. at 6. As
stated above, the reliance on bonds might well be an illusory proposition. Without
the bond passage, the costs in the first ten years for capital outlay are dramatically
increased, that is, $21 billion 1994 dollars would be needed to complete all of the
prison construction. See Welch Memorandum, supra note 131, at 9.
195. Peter Greenwood, one of the authors of the RAND study cited in Romero's
report, stated, "I do not in any way, shape or form see it as conservative." See Dan
Morain, Wilson Adviser Says '3 Strikes' Will Save Money, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994,
at A3. Greenwood indicated that the average out-of-pocket expense for a crime is
between $1000 and $2000. See id. If a felon commits 20 crimes per year, the cost
would only be $20,000 to $40,000 per year. Mark Kleiman, a Harvard professor who
co-authored a second study cited in the report, stated that Romero was "just plain
wrong." Id. Kleiman took issue with Romero's unfounded assumption that every
person imprisoned under "three strikes" would be committing the same number of
crimes at age 60 as at age 20. See id.; Franklin E. Zimring, The Voodoo Economics
of California Crime, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 3. Zimring referred to the
crime estimates and cost numbers as "back-of-a-napkin" guesses which have no em-
pirical support. Id. He supported his criticism through an examination of Califor-
nia's history of increased incarceration since 1980. See id. California has confined
140,000 more offenders in prisons and jails than were incarcerated in 1980. At the
$200,000 per year cost of incarceration projected by Romero, California should al-
ready be saving at least $28 billion every year. See Morain, supra, at A3. Zimring
also took issue with Romero's claim that savings would come in the form of "lower
insurance premiums, less medical care, reduced theft losses, and higher property val-
ues." Zimring, supra, at 3. He noted that none of these expected savings have ma-
terialized in the past decade. See id. Furthermore, Zimring demonstrated that if 20
crimes per year were actually avoided, "the crime rate should now be zero." Id. If
California's craze over incarcerating criminals in the last decade had worked, the
significant expenditures from "three strikes" would not be necessary. See id.
196. Dana Wilkie, Three-strikes Law Seen as an Economic Boon, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Apr. 7, 1994, at A3.
197. See e.g., 3 STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT COMMITTEE, JUDGE RULES "3 STRIKES
SAVES $23 BILLION" IS O.K. FOR BALLOT PAMPHLET (Press Release Aug. 15, 1994)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Superior Court Judge James
T. Ford ruled that the claim of savings of $23 billion by the year 2000 could stay on
the ballot. See Peter Hecht, '3 Strikes' Fight Rages Inside, Outside Court, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, Aug. 16, 1994, at B1.
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G. The Initiative and a Failed Alternative
After passage of A.B. 971, the Senate briefly considered reviv-
ing the Rainey measure and placing it on the ballot.'98 Wilson op-
posed the alternative measure because it would mislead the voters
and because he had touted the virtues of the original bill as a pri-
mary campaign issue.'99 He threatened to veto the alternative pro-
posal. 20 In light of the threatened veto, Rainey refused to champion
the bill despite broad support from various law enforcement groups
like the CDAA,2' officials including state sheriffs and police chiefs,
198. See Hallye Jordan, Alternative '3 Strikes' Bill Pushed, L.A. DAILY J., June 10,
1994, at 3.
199. See George Skelton, Pete (Give 'em Hell) Wilson Strikes Back, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1994, at A3. In support of applying "three strikes" in a famous case where a
defendant mugged a homeless person for 50 cents, Wilson said:
The editorial writers, the pundits are claiming this thug is a victim of a mis-
guided law.... The 'victim' has a rap sheet that is 52 pages long.... The
critics say that's proof of everything that is wrong with the 'three strikes'
law. Well, the hell with that. I say it's proof of everything that's right with
'three strikes.'
Id.
200. See Wilson Says He Will Block Try to Weaken '3 Strikes', S.F. CHRON., June
10, 1994, at D3.
201. The support from the CDAA waned when Rainey refused to back the bill.
See Michael D. Harris, Garcetti Calls for New 3-Strikes Law, L.A. DAILY J., June 9,
1994, at 2. Gil Garcetti went public with his plea for the Rainey alternative. See id.
Garcetti was joined in his public campaign by San Mateo County District Attorney
James Fox in urging the legislature to pass the alternative bill. See id. Specifically,
Garcetti predicted, "there's not going to be justice for those citizens who rely on the
civil court process for relief and justice." Id. Garcetti reported that in just three
months, his office had filed 400 third-strike cases and 1100 second-strike cases. See
id. He further reported that "none of those cases are settling and that they all are
going to go to trial." Id. In the weeks after "three strikes" was passed, the Los An-
geles District Attorney announced that he was eliminating sections of his office to
"free up" experienced deputies for "three-strikes" cases. See id.
In support of the alternative, Garcetti pleaded, "[I]et the taxpayers of Cali-
fornia decide how their tax dollars are spent in prosecuting violent criminals." Carl
Ingram, Support Sought for '3 Strikes' Alternative, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at A3.
Co-author of A.B. 971, Jim Costa, who was running for a state senate seat, re-
sponded: "Voters have a choice in November. They can vote for ['three strikes'] or
they can vote against it." Id.
In addition, Garcetti and district attorneys supporting him were made to look
like the enemy. Chuck Cavalier, a consultant with the Three Strikes You're Out
Committee, accused Garcetti and like-minded district attorneys of only being con-
cerned with plea bargaining and clearing caseloads. See Peter Hecht, Case Merits '3
Strikes'? Depends on the DA, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 7, 1994, at Al. He said
"[t]hat they simply don't like the fact that they will be held accountable." Id. This
accusation did not comport with the fact that, despite his personal opposition, Gar-
cetti was prosecuting every possible third-strike case coming through his office. See
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and private citizens like Polly Klaas's father and grandfather. Wil-
son's opposition effectively killed the chances of an alternative ap-
pearing on the ballot. The Rainey bill died in the Assembly Public
Safety Committee on June 21, 1994.2°
Without an alternative proposition and without significant
funding, opponents of Proposition 184 could not get their message
out. Left unchecked, proponents of "three strikes" were able to en-
gage in a major propaganda campaign of embarrassing proportions.
In the published argument for Proposition 184, proponents stated
that the measure would "keep[ career criminals, who rape women,
molest innocent children and commit murder, behind bars where
they belong."2"3 They repeated the chimerical savings argument,
that "3 STRIKES SAVES LIVES AND TAXPAYER
DOLLARS! ' '204 The literature answered three main counterargu-
ments. First, in response to a claim that the prison system would be
full of nonviolent offenders, it claimed that "three strikes" targets
only career criminals-those with a history of committing serious or
violent crimes. 5 Second, in response to the claim that taxes would
be increased, it stated that taxpayers would save money because
California citizens "will no longer have to pay the outrageous costs
of running career criminals through the judicial system's revolving
door."26 Third, it rebutted the claim that essential services would
have to be cut, citing again the savings created by the initiative.
202. See Hallye Jordan, Alternative to '3 Strikes' Killed, L.A. DAILY J., June 22,
1994, at 3.
203. California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 36.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 37.
206. Id.
207. See id. In order to illustrate how taxpayer dollars would be saved, the pam-
phlet reported that "3 STRIKES WILL SAVE TAXPAYERS $23 BILLION over
five years." Id. at 36. Relying on Romero's report, the committee further explained
that "[e]very repeat felon returned to our streets costs nearly $200,000 annually in
direct losses to victims and the enormous expense of running the same criminals
through the police stations, courts, and prisons time and again." Id. at 36. Oppo-
nents of the measure strongly objected to the use of Romero's study in the "Pro" ar-
gument because it had been disparaged by its sources, notably the RAND Corpora-
tion. See Judge Rules "3 Strikes Saves $23 Billion" is O.K. for Ballot Pamphlet, supra
note 197. The opponents filed suit to enjoin supporters of the initiative from dis-
seminating Romero's study as if it were fact. See id. However, Sacramento Superior
Court Judge James T. Ford ruled that the claim of $23 billion in savings from "three
strikes" would be allowed. See id.
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H. Proposition 184: Misleading the Voters
The Romero study contains serious methodological flaws that
grossly overstate the benefits of Proposition 184. Nonetheless, pro-
ponents of Proposition 184 relied heavily on the report in campaign-
ing for the ballot initiative.28 This Section reviews some of the ways
in which voters were misled.
Claims that "three strikes" will reduce crime are premised on
two straightforward propositions. First, repeat offenders will not be
able to commit additional crimes when they are in prison.29 That is,
"[u]nlike probation and parole, incarceration makes it physically
impossible for offenders to victimize the public with new crimes for
as long as they are locked up.", 210 Second, long prison sentences will
deter other criminals from committing crimes.
208. See supra notes 179-96,203-07 and accompanying text.
209. For example, the president of the California Police Chiefs' Association
wrote, "[b]y depriving these recent offenders of a future life of crime, we have
helped create a brighter future for law-abiding residents." Ronald E. Lowenberg, '3
Strikes' Costs Money but Pays Off, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, at B9.
At a 1995 University of West Los Angeles symposium on the "three-strikes"
law, Governor Pete Wilson stated that the law "is not only emotionally attractive,
but it is also a judicially sound policy for the simple reason that the repeat, violent
offenders, targeted by the legislation, have shown that they are beyond reform and
that they will only continue to bring terror to our citizens." Pete Wilson, Justice De-
mands and California Needs-"Three Strikes," 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 239, 240
(1995). At the same symposium, California Secretary of State Bill Jones stated that
"'Three Strikes' is an anti-crime law, not just an anti-violent crime law. It was our
intent in enacting 'Three Strikes,' not only to keep dangerous repeat felons in prison
(that is why the third strike can be any felony), but also to begin moving toward the
concept of zero tolerance for crime." Jones, supra note 127, at 245.
An article addressing concerns regarding the type of offenders being caught
in the wide net of California's "three-strikes" law reported that "[i]f the past
[criminal record] is a prologue, then the statute is removing hundreds of offenders
who most predictably would commit more felonies if they weren't in prison." Andy
Furillo, Most Offenders Have Long Criminal Histories, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31,
1996, at Al. This reasoning, however, is not without criticism. A county assistant
public defender stated: "'I don't see much difference between that and just running
a record check on the people that have two strikes and going off and arresting them
and sending them to prison. Why go through the process of waiting until they com-
mit a minor offense?"' Id.
210. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CASE FOR MORE
INCARCERATION 1 (1992).
211. California State Senator Phil Wyman wrote: "Three Strikes is not aimed
solely at those who have already committed violent or heinous crimes.... The pri-
mary purpose of [the law] is not simply to punish serious or violent felons, but also to
deter other such felons from committing future crimes." Wyman & Schmidt, supra
note 53, at 257.
Proponents have stated that "three strikes" has lowered crime rates. See Ed-
gar Sanchez, Crime Declines in State's Big Cities, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 13, 1996,
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The premise that incarceration will reduce the crime rate has
strong intuitive appeal. However, empirical verification of this
premise is difficult. Professor Franklin Zimring and Dr. Gordon
Hawkins offer some sobering observations in a book published after
the adoption of "three strikes." In Incapacitation: Penal Confine-
ment and the Restraint of Crime, Zimring and Hawkins examined
the effect of California's increased use of long prison sentences
during the 1980s. 212 Upon examining the data, the authors ques-
tioned the causal link between incarceration and the crime rate.
California did experience a drop in the crime rate, but the rate for
most crimes-including homicide, robbery, assault, and auto theft-
declined only slightly. " Burglary and larceny declined sharply;2 4
however, this decline occurred among juvenile offenders, while the
increase in incarceration was among adult offenders.2 5
Other problems exist with the cost-benefit analysis of studies
like the Romero study. Such analysis purports to identify offenders'
rates of crime and the cost of the crimes prevented and then multi-
plies one by the other to determine the benefit of incarcerating
those offenders.21 The savings are then compared with the cost of
incarcerating those offenders. However, measurement of crimes
at B4 (reporting an 8.5% decrease in the number of major crimes reported in Cali-
fornia's largest law enforcement jurisdictions and quoting Attorney General Dan
Lungren as saying that very strong case can be made that three strikes has been a big
part of the reduction). If that is the case, it must be because of the law's deterrent
effect, not from the enhanced prison sentences, since offenders imprisoned under
"three strikes" have yet to begin serving the enhanced term of years. For example, a
robber arrested after "three strikes" became law would have been sentenced to a
term of years even without "three strikes" and almost certainly would still be serving
that term today. See, e.g., EDWARD R. JAGELS, OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
COUNTY OF KERN, RUMINATIONS ON "THREE STRIKES": A REPORT TO THE KERN
COUNTY BD. OF SUPERVISORS ON THE LOCAL IMPACT OF A.B. 971 AND PROPOSITION
184 3 (1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (explaining that
any reduction in the crime rate of Kern County may not be attributed to the inca-
pacitation of offenders pursuant to "three strikes" because every third-strike defen-
dant presently incarcerated already would have been incarcerated under prior law
anyway).
212. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 185. Authors Zimring and Hawkins
attribute the shift from rehabilitation theory in the 1970s to incapacitation policies in
the 1980s and beyond to the numerous opponents of rehabilitation who attacked the
ideal without advancing a specific alternative penological theory. See id. at 6-14.
The authors explain that "[h]aving begun the period as a stepchild without a support-
ing academic constituency, incapacitation has remained so until the present time."
Id. at 13.
213. See id. at 100-01.
214. See id. at 101.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 136.
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prevented and cost of crimes committed are problematic because
estimates of crime rates are notoriously imprecise. Studies attempt-
ing to measure the number of crimes prevented for each year of in-
carceration demonstrate profound difficulties in quantification. The
estimates of the number of crimes prevented per year vary from 3.3
to 187 crimes per offender.1 7
Different methodologies used by researchers may explain the
disparities in the various studies. For example, some studies focused
on self-reporting by incarcerated individuals.218  Self-reporting is
problematic because the motives and memories of the offenders
may distort the results.2 19 Further, questioning offenders arrested at
the height of their criminal careers skews the benefits of long-term
incarceration. m Any measurement flaws become grossly exagger-
ated when numbers are projected over a significant term of years.
Further, measuring individual crime rates, rather than commu-
nity impact,2' overstates the benefits of incarceration.m Studies of
individual crime rates typically ignore that offenders often commit
crimes in groups. Incarceration of one member of a group may have
little effect on the overall crime rate because a group member can
be replaced m Once the criminal returns to the street, not only may
heU4 return to committing crime, but, in the meantime, his group
may have enlisted another offender.m' Hence, incarceration may in-
crease the number of offenses. At a minimum, it explains why if one
burglar who will commit twenty burglaries per year with two associ-
ates is incarcerated while his two associates remain active on the
street, the crime rate will not decline.
Additional considerations affect crime rates. Opportunities to
commit crime may be "unlimited and undifferentiated."' 2 For ex-
ample, drug interdiction has failed because other suppliers simply
217. See id. at 38,50, 145.
218. See id. at 81 (discussing surveys conducted by the RAND Corporation be-
tween 1976 and 1980).
219. See id. at 82.
220. See id. at 83.
221. See id. at 43 (defining community impact as the net effect of the absence of
criminal activity in the community setting).
222. See id. at 53-54.
223. See id.
224. It is the general policy of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review to use gen-
der-neutral language. The author, however, has chosen not to conform to this policy.
225. See id. at 54.
226. Id. at 56.
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fill the void left upon the arrest of a drug dealer.27 Incarcerating one
person for selling drugs does not reduce the crime rate if five other
sellers are available. By contrast, reducing demand, by treating or
incarcerating one drug user, may have a measurable effect on the
crime rate.
Recognizing the inadequacies of existing studies, Professor
Zimring and Dr. Hawkins estimated that during a period of dra-
matically increased incarceration in California, the crime rate only
dropged by about 3.5 crimes per offender per year of incarcera-
tion -far less than the "conservative" estimate of twenty crimes
per year relied upon by "three-strikes" proponents.2"
Similar doubts exist concerning Philip J. Romero's estimated
savings from each crime prevented. Romero determined the cost of
crime by adding the victims' out-of-pocket expenses, the monetary
value of pain and suffering, and the costs of crime prevention that
would be saved if the crime did not occur.23' Acknowledging that
227. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, supra note 105, at 116
(commenting that, despite an increase in arrests and harsher sentences, the war on
drugs did not force drug dealers off the streets; instead, drug dealing remained
steady or increased in the affected communities). Joseph Perkins, a columnist for the
San Diego Union-Tribune, noted that as long as the street value of an ounce of co-
caine, $1500, is more than the value of an ounce of gold, $350, there will be drug
merchants willing to meet the demand for illicit drugs. See Joseph Perkins, Legalize
Drugs? No, Let's Work on Cutting Demand, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 19, 1993, at
All.
228. Perkins argues that "[lt is profit that drives the drug trade. And the way to
reduce the profitability of drugs is not by stemming supply, but by dampening de-
mand." Perkins, supra note 227, at All. Perkins proposes a way to reduce the de-
mand and advocates Attorney General Janet Reno's "carrot-and-stick approach" to
the drug problem: "The carrot should be treatment on demand for those who need
help to beat their self-destructive habit. The stick should be swift and sure punish-
ment for those who refuse treatment and get caught buying or doing drugs." Id. Ex-
amples of such a policy at work can be seen in Miami and Baltimore. These cities
require nonviolent offenders to undergo mandatory, periodic drug testing in addition
to substance abuse treatment. See Janet Reno, Fighting Youth Violence: The Future
Is Now, 11 CRIM. JUST. 30, 33 (1996). Participants receive mandatory penalties if
they do not display satisfactory progress. See id. The success of such programs is
demonstrated by drops in recidivism-Miami had a 33% drop in recidivism and Bal-
timore decreased its expected re-arrests by 50%. See id.
229. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 185, at 114-17 (concluding that in-
creased incarceration of an additional 115,000 people led to a reduction of 3.5 of-
fenses per individual per year).
230. See ROMERO, supra note 181, at 3. But see Zimring, supra note 195, at 3
(arguing that if the estimate used by Philip Romero, chief economist of the Gover-
nor's Office of Planning and Research, was accurate, given California's incarceration
increases during the 1980s, the crime rate should already have dropped to zero).
231. See ROMERO, supra note 181, at 2.
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society's expenditures for crime prevention would not be reduced in
equal proportion to a reduction in crime, Romero hypothesized the
actual cost reduction if crimes were prevented by the increased in-
capacitation of habitual offenders.232 He calculated the savings that
would result if society actually did not spend either twenty-five or
seventy-five percent of the costs attributable to each crime
avoided23' Based on an estimated twenty crimes per year prevented
by a year of incarceration, Romero estimated that a year of impris-
onment saves between $137,512 and $248,868, far exceeding the cost
of incarceration.23 Further, Romero estimated that if "three
strikes" prevented 150 crimes per year, the savings would jump to
between $302,536 and $515,215.2s
Small overestimates in either number of crimes or cost per
crime produce dramatic results. Hence, as RAND study author Pe-
ter Greenwood has argued, if we rely on average out-of-pocket ex-
penses of between $1000 and $2000 per crime and Romero's twenty
crimes per offender figure, the savings amount to only $20,000 to
$40,000 per year.26 Comparing this figure to the cost of incarcerat-
ing an offender leads to different conclusions. Zimring and Hawk-
ins's estimated reduction of only 3.5 crimes per yeare7 would further
reduce the savings to about $3500 to $7000.
The Romero study contained other flaws that make its conclu-
sions suspect. For example, Romero did not consider the effect of
age on the number of crimes committed per offender per year. 8
Violent felonies are committed most frequently by young male of-
232. See id. at 3.
233. See id. at 3 tbl.1.
234. See id.
235. See id. Romero's estimated savings from crime prevention measures are al-
most certainly overstated. Those expenditures are driven by public fear about crime,
rather than by the reality of those risks. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N,
supra note 105, at 3 (reporting a vast difference between the public perception of
crime and the reality of crime rates in the United States-the reality being that crime
rates have remained stable for several years). See generally id. at 61-98 (exploring
the prevailing criminal policies and attributing their failure to having been imple-
mented as reactions to public fear of crime, rather than crime itself). But "three
strikes" is a case study of how politicians use fear of crime and ignore the reality-
here that crime rates were decreasing-for political advantage. See John Vasconcel-
los, Three Strikes and You're Out: No, DOCKET, Mar. 1994, at 11 (criticizing such
politicians and stating, "I abhor politicians who pander to people's fear with simplis-
tic and ineffective solutions, providing a false sense of security rather than actual
safety.").
236. See Morain, supra note 195, at A3.
237. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
238. See Morain, supra note 195, at A3.
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fenders.239 The crime and recidivism rates of offenders sharply de-
cline as they age.24°
Romero and the "three-strikes" campaign literature also ig-
nored a fundamental question: whether similar savings through re-
duction in crime may have been available at a lower cost. Instead,
the published literature in support of Proposition 184 relied on sen-
sationalism to obfuscate the issue. It promised to keep rapists, mur-
derers, and child molesters behind bars where they belong.24'
While "three strikes" may put violent felons behind bars-
though in many cases a murderer would receive an equal or more
severe penalty under existing law 42 -it ignores the reality that the
majority of offenders within the provisions of Proposition 184 would
not be murderers, rapists, and child molesters.243 Inclusion of bur-
glary as a "strike," and making the third strike any felony, guaran-
teed that most offenders within the provisions of "three strikes"
would not be murderers, rapists, or child molesters. 2" Given the ab-
sence of a "wash-out" period,245 the law also guaranteed that many
239. See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 150, at 141-42.
240. See PROJECT FOR OLDER PRISONERS, REPORT TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK
12-13 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); WILSON & HERRNSTEIN,
supra note 150, at 126-41. Based on the 1994 crime index, defendants age 20 to 29
commit 34% of the reported violent crimes. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1994, 227-28 tbl.38
(1995) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE U.S. 1994]. The rate of violent crimes drops to
24.6% for defendants age 30 to 39, 9.2% for the 40 to 49 age group, 2.5% for the 50
to 59 age group, and a mere 1.1% for the over 60 age group. See id.
241. See California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 36.
242. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1997) (indicating that every person
convicted of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, or 25 years to life; every person convicted of mur-
der in the second degree shall be sentenced for 15 years to life, or for 20 years to life
if the killing was committed by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle, or
25 years to life if the victim was a peace officer).
243. See supra note 142.
244. During the first eight months of the California "three-strikes" law, approxi-
mately 70% of all second- and third-strike defendants had been convicted of nonvio-
lent and nonserious offenses. See ESPARZA, supra note 142, at 8. Among the 30%
charged with serious or violent felonies, almost half involved burglary as the felony
charged. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 142, at 9. Only 17% of
those convicted of a second-strike felony were convicted of violent or serious of-
fenses. See id. at 2. As of January 31, 1996, 41% of second- and third-strike offend-
ers were subject to "three strikes" penalties for committing a property offense. See
CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, IMPACT OF "THREE STRIKES" LAW ON THE CALI-
FORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS chart 6a (1996). Next only to possession of a
controlled substance, petty theft with prior and second degree burglary served as the
most frequent second- and third-strike convictions. See id.
245. California's "three-strikes" law specifically rejects "wash-out" provisions.
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older felons committing drug offenses would be swept within its sen-
tencing provisions. As supported by follow-up data, many "three-
strikes" offenders are older felons who have almost certainly
"graduated" from violent crime.24
I. The RAND Report
In September, 1994, the RAND Corporation issued a report
concerning the fiscal impact and crime prevention efficiency of
"three strikes. 2 47 The report might have brought rationality to the
"three-strikes" debate.2 4  But given its timing-after alternatives
like the Rainey bill249 had been tabled and the initiative process was
in full swing, and given that Pete Wilson had tied his election cam-
paign to "three strikes" 2°--the RAND report was too little, too
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(c)(3), 1170.12(a)(3) (mandating that the length of time
between a prior felony conviction and a current felony conviction shall not affect im-
position of sentence). For instance, if a 45-year-old defendant had two prior felony
convictions dating back 25 years, and was subsequently convicted of a felony-which
could be a nonserious or nonviolent felony-that defendant would be subject to the
provisions of "three strikes."
246. Second- and third-strike offenders over the age of 30 comprise about 46% of
"three-strikes" defendants. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 244, at
chart 8. This statistic is cQnsistent with the rates of violent crime according to age
groups observed by the U.S. Department of Justice in its 1994 crime index. See
CRIME IN THE U.S. 1994, supra, note 240, at 227-28 tbl.38. The statistics from the na-
tional crime index reveal that people over the age of 30 accounted for 37.4% of all
violent crimes in 1994, while people over the age of 40 accounted for only 12.8% of
all violent crimes. See id.
Experts also attribute a further 9% drop in the 1995 violent crime rate to the
age factor. See Crimes of Violence Continue to Drop, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 18,
1996, at A7. Jack Levin of Boston's Northeastern University believes "[t]he baby
boomers have matured into their 30s and 40s .... They are mellowing out, perhaps
aging gracefully, and they are graduating out of high-risk violence and property
crimes ...... Id.
247. See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 137, at xi.
248. See id. at 2-3. The stated goals of the RAND Corporation in compiling its
study were: (1) to inform the public about Proposition 184 on the November 1994
ballot; (2) to discuss alternative versions of "three strikes" that may have been con-
sidered if the Proposition failed; and (3) to inform other states that were considering
implementation of "three-strikes" laws. See id. The authors remarked that
"[c]itizens are not getting much information on [the cost of "three strikes"] from the
law itself, the media, or their elected representatives." Id. at 2. The study concluded
that California would benefit from crime rate reduction if the "three-strikes" law
were fully implemented, but it would come at substantial costs. See id. at xii. RAND
demonstrated that considerable reduction in crime could be achieved at a substan-
tially lower cost than with "three strikes." See id. at xiii.
249. See id. at xii.
250. See Jean 0. Pasco, Wilson Will Test His Themes Nationwide, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Mar. 24, 1995, at 1.
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late.
The RAND report constructed models to predict the relative
efficiency and cost of five sentencing-enhancement proposals. 1I The
report estimated the crime reduction from A.B. 971 to be between
twenty-two and thirty-four percent.5 The legislation would gener-
ate minor savings in several areas, including the cost of police, ad-
judication, trials, and jail operation. Any savings would be
"overwhelmed by a large difference in prison operating cost[s and a
12-fold increase in the annual cost of prison construction." The
cost of implementing "three strikes" was estimated to be $5.5 billion
annually.
"Three strikes" would achieve the greatest reduction in crime
but was by far the most expensive.255 The alternative with the most
promise was the Guaranteed Full Term (GFT) proposal which
would have given California almost as much reduction in crime.
The report singled out GFT because it would reduce costs by
"incapacitating offenders early in their criminal careers. ' 'u6
251. RAND examined the effects of the following alternatives to "three strikes":
"Jones Second-Strike Only"; "Jones Violent Only"; "Rainey Three Strikes"; and a
variant constructed by Jones and Rainey entitled "Guaranteed Full Term (GFT)."
See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 137, at 7-10. The Jones Second-Strike Only al-
ternative would be triggered by a conviction for any felony with a prior serious or
violent felony and eliminate the third-strike provision. See id. at 8. The Jones Vio-
lent Only alternative would apply only to a defendant with a current conviction for a
violent felony and a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony. See id. at 8-9.
The Rainey Three Strikes alternative was identical to the Rainey bill that was pro-
posed in the legislature. See id. at 9. The GFT alternative would require a prison
term for all serious or violent felonies even if the defendant had no priors. See id.
GFT would not allow a good time reduction for serious or violent felons and would
cut costs by not incarcerating half of the people convicted of minor offenses. See id.
252. See id at xii. RAND projected that the number of serious and violent crimes
prevented would increase quickly over the first 10 years and more slowly thereafter.
See id. at 22.
253. Id. at 19-20.
254. See id. at 18.
255. See id. at 25-30. RAND projected that the crime reduction for "three
strikes" would result in a 120% increase in cost over the previous prison budget. See
id. Jones Second-Strike Only would have yielded 85% of the crime reduction of
"three strikes" with a 90% increase in the prison budget. See id. at 25, 26 tbl.4.4.
Rainey Three Strikes was about as effective and costly as Jones Second Strike, See
id. at 26 tbl.4.4. Jones Violent Only would yield two-thirds of the crime reduction of
"three strikes," but would increase the prison budget by 57%. See id. at 26 tbl.4.4,
27. GFT matched the crime reduction effectiveness of "three strikes" with only a
97% increase in prison budget. See id.
256. Id. at 29. Each of the alternative models would increase costs significantly
but not to the level of "three strikes." See id. at28 fig.4.8 (comparing cost per seri-
ous crime prevented from "three strikes" and alternatives).
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The RAND report made projections similar to those made by
the CDC.27 However, the report went further and analyzed how the
state was likely to fund the increased costs.28 It argued that a tax in-
crease was unlikely and that the electorate was unlikely to approve
prison bond issues.29 It then explored how the prison expansion
could be paid for from the General Fund.2" The most probable re-
sult, if "three strikes" was to be funded, was that "three strikes"
would compete directly with higher education funds. 1
Both A.B. 971 and Proposition 184 were passed by wide mar-
257. See id. at 18.
258. See id. at 31-36.
259. See id. at 32. Passage of bond issues used to be a virtual certainty in Califor-
nia, but that has changed in the past few elections as California voters became more
conscious of increasing the state's debt. Twelve out of 14 bond measures were re-
jected by California voters in November 1990. See Virginia Ellis, Backers Fear Vot-
ers' Aversion to New Debt, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1994, at A3. These measures would
have provided funds for purchasing ancient forests, expanding the university system,
and constructing prisons. See id.
Voters were not the only ones against the issuance of bonds to raise money
for prisons. In 1994 Governor Wilson proposed a $2 billion prison bond measure
which was strongly opposed by Senate Republican Leader Ken Maddy. See Daniel
M. Weintraub, Wilson's Budget Slashes Welfare, Backs New Prisons, L.A. TIMEs,
Jan. 8, 1994, at Al. Senator Maddy, usually a strong ally of the Governor, argued
that the state was already too much in debt. See id.
The reluctance to issue bonds does not bode well for the CDC. The CDC
has requested $6 billion in bonds to finance the construction of 25 new prisons it es-
timates it will need over the next five years to handle the predicted prisoner increase
resulting from the "three-strikes" law. See Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, Tobacco
Industry Power May Go Up in Smoke, Foes Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at A3.
260. See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 137, at 32-36.
261. See id. at 33-34. Faced with the unfavorable predictions from the RAND
study, supporters of "three strikes" attacked its validity. They claimed that the re-
port failed to consider the economic benefits of the measure, specifically deterrence
and lower insurance rates. See Ben Wildavsky, '3 Strikes' Could Drain College
Money, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1994, at A21. Bill Jones assailed the study for unfairly
depicting "three strikes" as competing with education and other state funded pro-
grams. Pamela J. Podger, '3 Strikes' Could Bust State, Study Says, FRESNO BEE, Sept.
22, 1994, at Al. Citing RAND's failure to address the report of the Governor's chief
economist, Alfie Charles of the Three Strikes You're Out Committee said: 'They
only look at half of the equation, and it's ridiculous .... One of the problems is that
Greenwood [author of the study] decided he opposed Three Strikes, then he drafted
a report to support his conclusion."' Bill Jones further disparaged the report by
saying, "'The beauty of a report for someone sitting in academia.., is they don't
have to get tough laws through the Assembly Public Safety Committee."' Id.
The solution to allocation of scarce resources may ultimately be the decision
by prosecutors to use "three strikes" selectively. See Susan Freinkel, Strike Zone,
AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1995, at 61, 61 (reporting that prosecutors are enforcing "three
strikes" according to voter support for the initiative in their constituencies).
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gins.2 2 But, as this Section has developed, those large majorities
were the product of a number of factors that prevented rational dis-
course about crime.26
Backed by seasoned veterans capable of playing political hard-
ball, Mike Reynolds wielded extraordinary power and used bullying
tactics to move A.B. 971 through the legislature.26" Despite those
tactics, he would not have succeeded but for the tragic kidnapping
and murder of Polly Klaas..26  Reynolds is a private citizen, not re-
sponsible for crafting legislation with an eye for sound public policy.
But most members of the legislature, as well as the gubernatorial
candidates, did not even attempt to craft sound legislation.266
As argued above, a number of sound alternatives were avail-
able.2 7 California's elected officials were well aware of the prob-
lems with A.B. 971 and Proposition 184.m Beating the anticrime
drum was just too tempting. Politicians like Pete Wilson had too
much to gain by backing bad legislation. Reliance on the Romero
study does not excuse policy makers. Its methodological flaws were
evident.269 Most members of the legislature acted no more respon-
sibly than the Governor.27° Finally, the ballot pamphlet supporting
Proposition 184 compounded misleading aspects of the Romero
study by its extravagant claims.2 1
Politicians are not likely to admit that they hoped or expected
the courts to save California from their political opportunism. But
politicians like Pete Wilson and Bill Jones must have been aware of
that possibility because they must have known of critics who pointed
out the deficiencies of "three strikes." As developed below, the
court did act responsibly in its review of the "three-strikes" law. Its
principled decision has given the legislature and the governor a sec-
ond opportunity to demonstrate similar responsible behavior.272
262. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part II.A-B and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 72-75, 82-85 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Part II.E.
267. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Part II.F.
270. See supra Part II.C.
271. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
272. See infra Part III.
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III. THE COURT TO THE RESCUE
"Three strikes" mandates long prison terms for some deserving,
but many undeserving, recidivists. Because the third strike may be
any felony, and most felonies are nonviolent, the law requires long
prison terms in a large number of cases where the underlying con-
duct is minor in comparison to the sentence imposed.273
In many sentencing schemes judges have discretion to avoid
unjust sentences. Even under sentencing laws like the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines,274 judges have limited discretion to depart from
sentencing norms in the interests of justice.275 Such discretion is im-
portant because, no matter how carefully a statute is crafted, legisla-
tors cannot anticipate all of the circumstances that may make a par-
ticular punishment unjust. Judicial discretion is also a necessary
antidote to excessive prosecutorial zeal.276
273. See supra note 148.
274. The federal system-although it has narrowed judicial discretion-permits
the court to depart from the sentencing guidelines if there is an aggravating or miti-
gating factor not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in determin-
ing the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
275. For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines recognize "the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct." Id. § 3553(a)(6); see also Michael Tonry, Sen-
tencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS
GUIDELINES 16-43 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987) (reviewing the sentencing
commissions of Minnesota, Maine, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Washington and concluding that the most successful sentencing com-
missions are those that develop presumptive sentencing guidelines and policies for
appellate sentence review); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988)
(providing an overview of the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
their intended goals).
276. Perhaps the most noted case in this regard is that of Jerry Dewayne Wil-
liams-"the pizza thief." See Slater, supra note 142, at B9. Williams, at the age of
27, was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life for stealing a slice of pepperoni pizza.
See id. Although he was found guilty of petty theft, a standard misdemeanor, his
prior convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, unauthorized use of a motor vehi-
cle, and possession of a controlled substance, bumped the misdemeanor conviction
up to a felony, which served as his final strike under California's "three-strikes" law.
See id.
There is also the case of Duane Silva, a 23-year-old who suffers from manic
depression and has an IQ of 70. See id. With previous convictions for setting fire to
trash barrels and the glove compartment of a car, Silva's final strike, stealing a video
recorder and a coin collection from his neighbors, landed him a 30 years to life sen-
tence. See id.
Stealing a drill from a garage was Ricky Valadez's final strike. See Lynch &
Cekola, supra note 142, at Al. With two prior residential burglaries serving as prior
strikes, including one that dated back to the late 1970s, Valadez was sentenced to 25
years to life. See id.
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Proponents of "three strikes" and many prosecutors argued that
subsection 667(f) denies judges the power to "strike" a prior felony
conviction to avoid sentencing a defendant who would otherwise
qualify under its provisions m Its proponents argued that they dis-
trusted "liberal" judges and, therefore, sought to prevent judges
from dismissing "three-strikes" cases.2  Whether judges had
authority to strike prior felonies was the issue resolved in Romero 9
On June 3,1994, the San Diego County district attorney filed an
information in a case that would provide a basis for review of one
key component of "three strikes."' ° Defendant Jesus Romero's
third strike was the charge of possession of 0.13 grams of cocaine
base.2u The district attorney pled the following prior felony convic-
tions: a 1980 conviction for second degree burglary, a 1984 convic-
Kevin Weber, a 35-year-old man with two previous burglary convictions, was
sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum of 26 years to be served, for enter-
ing a closed restaurant from the roof and stuffing four cookies into his pockets. See
Crumby Crime: Life Sentence for Cookie Thief, 82 A.B.A. J. 12 (1996).
A recent study addressing the effects of California's "three-strikes" law re-
ported that, in the two years since its enactment, the law has led to life imprisonment
for 192 marijuana users, while only 40 convicted murderers, 25 rapists, and 24 kid-
nappers have been sentenced to life. See Whittell, supra note 142, at 12.
277. See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
278. One reporter noted that the power to dismiss prior strikes was intentionally
vested in the prosecutor, rather than in the judge. See James F. Sweeney, Foul Ball,
NAT'L REV., Aug. 12, 1996, at 1, 1. For the system to work, he noted, judges must be
"denied the discretion to unilaterally reduce mandatory sentences in the amorphous
'interest of justice."' Id. He further explained that this provision of "three strikes"
represents a tacit understanding that judges rarely stand for reelection and are "too
often enthralled with the liberal paradigm equating 'judicial independence' and
'fairness' with leniency to criminals." Id. Against this backdrop of the criminal
"victim," however, is the prosecutor. As an elected official, the prosecutor must
fight for public safety or face the wrath of the electorate at election time-a battle
the judiciary need never face. See id. Nevertheless, that argument ignores the fact
that state court judges do face reelection.
Statements by the drafters before passage conflict, but there is ample support
that, based on their distrust, they intended to limit judicial discretion to prevent
judges from gutting the law. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The
Romero decision rekindled drafters' fears about how judges would use discretion if it
were granted. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing Secretary of
State Bill Jones's disdainful response accusing the judiciary of protecting "their turf"
rather than the safety of Californians); supra note 33 and accompanying text
(quoting Wilson's dissatisfied reaction with the decision in People v. Superior Court
(Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996)). To counteract
Romero, Reynolds and the CDAA are planning to put the Save 'Three Strikes' Pub-
lic Safety Act of 1998 on the ballot. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
279. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 497-98, 917 P.2d at 628,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
280. See id. at 506, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
281. See id.
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tion for attempted burglary of an inhabited dwelling, a 1986 convic-
tion for first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and convic-
tions for possession of a controlled substance in 1992 and 1993.m
Without "three-strikes" provisions, the defendant's sentence for the
offense at bar would have been between one and six years2m
The trial court was willing to strike prior felony convictions if
Romero pled guilty.2 The prosecutor contended that the court
lacked the power to strike prior felony convictions absent prosecu-
torial consent. 5 The court held that, were the statute so read, it
would violate the state constitutional doctrine of separation of pow-
ers. "6 The court sentenced Romero to a term of six years in
prison.27 The court of appeal reversed the trial court and held that
"three strikes" denied the trial court authority to dismiss a prior fel-
ony conviction on its own motion.m The California Supreme Court
granted Romero's petition for review.29
Romero was the ideal case in which to raise key constitutional
challenges to "three strikes." Three aspects of Romero's record are
compelling: first, none of his convictions involved a crime of vio-
lence; second, his serious felonies were committed in the 1980s-the
most recent being approximately eight years before the current fel-
ony; third, his current offense, like his other more recent felony
convictions, was a drug offense.29 Incarcerating a man who appears
to be near the end of his criminal career to a term of twenty-five
282. See id.
283. See id. The current charge for possession of a controlled substance was pun-
ishable by 16 months, two years, or three years in prison. See id. The three prior
felonies for which defendant served prison terms within the last five years, if not
stricken pursuant to section 1385, would result in three consecutive one-year en-
hancements. See id. at 506-07, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792. The court
imposed a sentence of six years in state prison, representing the upper term for pos-
session of a controlled substance plus the three consecutive one-year enhancements.
See id. at 507, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793. Under "three strikes" the de-
fendant was eligible for a life sentence because of his two prior "serious felonies."
See id. at 506, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.




288. See id. The court of appeal also held that Romero's sentence was not a vio-
lation of California's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. See People v.
Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 382 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
289. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507, 917 P.2d at 632,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
290. See id. at 506, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
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years to life seems excessive and a poor use of resources.29' The
facts of the case and the disposition in the court of appeal strongly
suggested that the supreme court would rule in Romero's favor.
Subsection 667(f) is the key provision whereby its drafters at-
tempted to limit judicial, and to some degree, prosecutorial discre-
tion.292 Subsection 667(f)(1) states that the key provisions of the law
"shall be applied in every case" involving defendants with two or
three strikes.2" A prosecutor must "plead and prove each prior fel-
ony."294 Thus, subsection 667(f)(1) limits the authority of a prosecu-
tor to bargain in a case within the provisions of the law.295 It recog-
nizes prosecutorial discretion, but such discretion is severely
limited. 6
Subsection 667(f)(2) provides that the prosecutor "may move to
dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction allegation in the further-
ance of justice pursuant to Section 1385, or if there is insufficient
evidence to prove the prior conviction." 297 Subsection 667(f)(2) fur-
ther provides that the role of the judge's discretion is limited to cases
in which "there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony
conviction.,
298
At a minimum, the subsection is badly drafted, a fact raised
prior to passage of A.B. 971.299 Read literally, the section is nonsen-
sical: A prosecutor may move to strike the prior felony on one of
two bases, but the court may grant such a motion only on the basis
of insufficient evidence.3 °
291. The proportionality issue was not addressed by the California Supreme
Court; instead, the issue was raised and rejected at the appellate level. She Romero,
37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378 n.15. The supreme court decided Romero on statutory
grounds alone. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 523, 917 P.2d at 643, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
804.
292. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(0 (West Supp. 1997).
293. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(1), 1170.12(d)(1).
294. Id.
295. See Brown, supra note 10, at 279-80 (discussing that prosecutors will take ad-
vantage of the ambiguity of subsection 667(0(2) and continue to plea bargain); see
also Menaster, supra note 15, at 285 (commenting that plea bargaining is only re-
stricted after the information or indictment is filed).
296. In other words, subsection 667(0 entirely removes the prosecutor's discretion
to charge-by requiring that each prior felony be pled and proved-and then revests
the prosecutorial power to strike a prior felony, "pursuant to section 1385," which
the court has discretion to grant or deny. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 523, 917 P.2d at 643,
53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804.
297. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(2), 1170.12(d)(2).
298. Id.
299. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
300. It would be unconstitutional for a statute to impose criminal sanctions based
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A more plausible interpretation of subsection 667(f)(2) is that a
prosecutor must allege all prior felonies and may thereafter move to
strike in the furtherance of justice or if there is insufficient evidence.
The court would have the obvious, implicit power to grant the mo-
tion if appropriate. Such a reading would be consistent with tradi-
301tional rules of statutory construction.
The second sentence would apply even if the prosecutor did not
move to strike and would allow the court to act on its own motion,
or presumably on the motion of the defendant. As advanced by its
proponents, however, the statute gives the court no power to strike
prior felonies. The court must, therefore, sentence the defendant in
accordance with the "three strikes" sentencing provisions, unless the
prosecutor moves to strike a prior felony in the interest of justice.
That interpretation is consistent with numerous statements by its
proponents and with Reynolds's distrust of liberal sentencing
judges.0 2
The supreme court disagreed. After a review of its separation-
of-powers case law, the court concluded that, if the statute were read
to deny the court authority to strike prior felonies, the statute would
violate the state constitution.0 3 The court observed that, when se-
lecting between two plausible readings of a statute, the court should
presume that the legislature intended not to violate the constitu-
tion. °4
The court also relied on the presumption that the legislature
must make a clear statement of its intent to eliminate a court's
power to strike a prior felony or to dismiss in the interests of justice
under section 1385.305 The court found that "three strikes" con-
tained no such clear legislative direction.05 Not only did the legisla-
tion contain no clear direction that the court's power was with-
drawn, but, according to the court, subsection 667(f)(2) makes
on insufficient evidence. Therefore, the language empowering the court, on its own
motion, to dismiss factually insupportable allegations is unnecessary. See Romero, 13
Cal. 4th at 523, 917 P.2d at 643, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804 (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307,313-16 (1979)).
301. When interpreting statutes, courts frequently depart from the literal meaning
of a word to give words a reasonable meaning. See 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw § 24 (2d ed. 1988).
302. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
303. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507-18, 917 P.2d at 632-39, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793-
800.
304. See id. at 509, 917 P.2d at 633, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
305. See id. at 517-18, 917 P.2d at 639, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.
306. See id. at 518-28, 917 P.2d at 639-46,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-07.
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explicit reference to section 1385, suggesting that the legislature in-
tended to retain that power in full force.3 Subsection 667(f)(2)
states that the prosecutor may "move to . . . strike a prior felony
conviction allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to Sec-
tion 1385." '  Although not explicit 309 the court must have the
power to grant that motion; hence, the legislature intended to pre-
serve the court's power under section 1385. 10
The court rejected the argument that section 667 limited a
court's power to strike prior felony convictions on its own only if the
evidence was insufficient." Various amici curiae advanced the ar-
gument that, in reliance on traditional rules of construction, subsec-
tion 667(f)(2) gave the court discretion on its own motion in one
limited instance-when the evidence was insufficient. Granting that
explicit power demonstrated its intent to exclude the power to strike
a prior felony conviction in the interests of justice.
The supreme court adopted an alternative reading of the stat-
ute: subsection 667(f)(2) requires the prosecutor to prove and plead
all prior felony convictions but then creates an exception-that a
prosecutor may move, pursuant to section 1385, to dismiss in fur-
307. See id. at 527-28, 917 P.2d at 646, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807. In reaching this
decision, the supreme court drew from the final proposed amendments of A.B. 971
before the bill was chaptered. The court found the following:
[T]he Legislature declined to add proposed language that would have de-
leted the reference to section 1385 [which] ... would clearly have elimi-
nated the court's power to strike prior felony allegations in furtherance of
justice sua sponte. Thus, the language in the Three Strikes law permitting
action "pursuant to section 1385" ... cannot realistically be seen as inadver-
tent.
Id. at 528, 917 P.2d at 646, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807 (citations omitted).
308. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(2), 1170.12(d)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
309. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
310. The legislature's failure to add the proposed language removing "three
strikes" from the requirements imposed by section 1385 may have been a conse-
quence of Reynolds's refusal to allow amendments to the bill. See supra notes 74,
83-91 and accompanying text.
311. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 519, 917 P.2d at 640,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801.
312. See id. at 522, 917 P.2d at 642-43, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803-04. Applying the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the attorney general argued that "the ex-
pression of the trial court's power to strike solely for insufficient evidence plainly
implies an exclusion of that court's power to strike in furtherance of justice." Id. at
522, 917 P.2d at 642, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803. The supreme court quickly dismissed
this argument. See id. It stated that the provision is not exhaustive, as evidenced by
the Attorney General's acknowledgment of the implicit power of the court to grant a
prosecutor's motion to strike a prior felony "in the furtherance of justice" without
any such explicit language within the statute. See id. at 522, 917 P.2d at 642-43, 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803-04.
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therance of justice.1 3 Implicitly the trial court may grant that mo-
tion. The prosecutor may also move to strike a felony conviction
that must be pled if the evidence is insufficient.3 4 Subsection
667(f)(2) does not limit the court's power to strike felonies; rather, it
makes explicit that a prosecutor's decision is subject to judicial
oversight.
According to the supreme court's reading, subsection 667(f)(2)
deals with prosecutorial responsibility-first, to allege all prior
felonies and second, to strike some. A court's power to grant the
motion to dismiss in the interests of justice is implicit; its power to
grant the motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is explicit. Its
power to dismiss a prior felony conviction on its own is found in
section 1385 because nothing in section 667 clearly eliminates that
authority.316 The specified authority to dismiss if the evidence of a
prior felony is insufficient only refers to the court's disposition of the
prosecutor's motion; implicit is its power to dismiss on its own
authority.
That explanation is strained. On its face the section only ad-
dresses a court's power to grant motions when those motions are
made by the prosecutor. The court's authority to move on its own is
found in section 1385 if in the interest of justice. If the evidence is
insufficient, the court's authority is found in the constitution. The
court's rationale does not explain why, when the prosecutor moves
to dismiss, the section does not mention a court's authority to grant
the prosecutor's motion to dismiss in the interests of justice but does
mention the less controversial power-or obligation7--to dismiss if
the evidence is insufficient.
The strained interpretation of section 667 is unfortunate.
Though the statute is poorly drafted,318 the court's interpretation
leaves the court open to criticism that it frustrated the intent of the
313. See id. at 522-23, 917 P.2d at 642-43, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803-04.
314. See id. at 522, 917 P.2d at 642, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
315. See id. at 522-23, 917 P.2d at 642-43, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803-04.
316. See id. at 527-30, 917 P.2d at 64648,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807-09.
317. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In Jackson the Supreme Court
ruled that, in federal habeus corpus proceedings, the judge must review the records
from state proceedings and determine whether the evidence "could reasonably sup-
port a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 318. In the event that the
standard has not been satisfied, the conviction must be reversed. See id. at 317.
318. See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text. See generally Thornbury, su-
pra note 13 (discussing ambiguity in the "three-strikes" law as a result of poor
draftsmanship).
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statute's drafters.319 The court could have reached the same result
by relying directly upon the constitutional argument it laid out.
Then, the court would have had ample precedent that dictated the
same result.
Prior to "three strikes," the leading supreme court case on the
separation-of-powers argument was People v. Tenorio.3 20 In Tenorio
the trial court dismissed a prior conviction without a motion from
the prosecutor in direct violation of section 11718 of the Health and
Safety Code,321 which provided, in relevant part, that no allegation of
fact that would enhance the penalty of the accused "may be dis-
missed by the court or stricken from the accusatory pleading except
upon motion of the district attorney."3'2 The statute conditioned the
trial court's authority on approval of the district attomey.
323
That condition, according to the supreme court, violated article
III, section 3 of the California Constitution.324 The court found that
the power to strike prior offenses is "an essential part of the judicial
power" and that section 11718 granted that judicial power to the
prosecutor.3z Inherent in the role of a judge is the power to dismiss
in the interests of justice; that power is violated when the court may
not do so unless the court "bargain[s] with the prosecutor."'3 26
As found by the supreme court in Romero, the analogy between
section 11718 and "three strikes" is a close one: both sections rec-
319. See Stephanie Simon, Angry 'Three Strikes' Supporters Vow to Fight Back,
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at A20. Almost immediately after the Romero ruling,
supporters of the "three-strikes" law proposed pressuring the legislature "to find a
way to reinstate the original intent of 'three strikes,' perhaps rewording it to elimi-
nate judicial [discretion]." Id.
320. 3 Cal. 3d 89,473 P.2d 993,89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970).
321. Section 11718 of the Health and Safety Code has since been repealed. See
1972 Cal. Stat. 2986, 2987 (repealing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11718).
322. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94,473 P.2d at 996,89 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
323. See id.
324. See id. at 95, 473 P.2d at 997, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
325. See id. at 93, 473 P.2d at 995, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (reasoning that "the power
to strike priors is an essential part of the judicial power... [and] that section 11718
constituted an invasion of that power because it grants to the prosecutor the unre-
viewable power to grant or to prevent a judicial resolution of a motion to strike pri-
ors").
326. Id. at 94, 473 P.2d at 996, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252; see also People v. Superior
Court (On Tai Ho), 11 Cal. 3d 59, 65, 520 P.2d 405, 409, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25 (1974)
(holding that a statute allowing a prosecutor to veto a judge's decision to sentence a
defendant to a diversion program violated the separation-of-powers doctrine);
Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 125, 485 P.2d 1140, 1144, 95 Cal. Rptr.
524, 528 (1971) (striking down portion of a statute which allowed the magistrate to
reduce a wobbler only with the approval of the prosecutor).
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ognize that the judiciary has power to strike prior convictions used
for sentence enhancements, but only if the prosecutor consents.
3Z7
Both sections give the prosecutor complete control over dismissing
prior convictions after the decision to prosecute has been made.
Finally, each provision requires judges to "bargain" with prosecutors
in order to exercise their discretion to strike prior convictions.329
Prior to Romero a number of California courts of appeal con-
sidered whether "three strikes" violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine. No court found such a violation.33 In those cases, as well
as in Romero, the state argued that "three strikes" limits prosecuto-
rial discretion and does not aggrandize prosecutorial power over the
judiciary. This was because subsection 667(g) forces prosecutors to
plead and prove all known prior felony convictions and does not al-
low prosecutors to enter a plea agreement to strike or seek dismissal
of prior felonies. 331 The only power to dismiss is found in subsection
667(f)2) which requires prosecutors to seek dismissal from the
court. Hence, unlike the situation in Tenorio, prosecutorial dis-
cretion is not arbitrary and unreviewable.333
327. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 513, 917 P.2d 628,
636, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 797 (1996).
328. See id at 514, 917 P.2d at 637, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798. In Davis v. Municipal
Court, 46 Cal. 3d 64, 757 P.2d 11, 249 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1988), the California Supreme
Court upheld a statute which permitted the district attorney to decide whether to
prosecute a defendant or to allow that defendant to enter a diversion program. In
distinguishing the statute at issue in this case from those statutes before the court in
Tenorio, Esteybar, and On Tai Ho, the court declared that:
when a district attorney is given a role during the "judicial phase" of a
criminal proceeding, such role will violate the separation-of-powers doc-
trine if it accords the district attorney broad, discretionary decision making
authority to countermand a judicial determination .... [D]istrict attor-
ney[s] [do not] improperly exercisefl"judicial authorit in violation of the
separation-of-powers doctrine when [they] exerciser- [their] traditional
broad discretion, before charges are filed, to decide what charges ought to
be prosecuted, even when that charging decision affects the defendant's
eligibility for diversion.
Id. at 85, 757 P.2d at 23, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
329. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 512, 917 P.2d at 635,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796.
330. See People v. Glaster, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1910, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (1995);
People v. Gore, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1396,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (1995); People v. Bailey,
46 Cal. App. 4th 743, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (1995); People v. Petty, 46 Cal. App. 4th
723, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1995); People v. Superior Ct. (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
364 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
331. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(g) (West Supp. 1997).
332. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 514, 917 P.2d at 636-37,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797-98.
333. In People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, the statute
in question provided that no prior conviction "may be dismissed by the court or
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The state also argued that Tenorio was inapplicable in light of
events occurring subsequent to that decision.334 In Tenorio the court
stated that "even if the Legislature could constitutionally remove
the power to strike priors from the courts, it has not done so."
3 3s
Since then, the legislature has limited judicial power to strike prior
felony convictions on several occasions, and state courts have up-
held these actions.336 Thus, the state argued, because trial courts do
not have unfettered discretion to strike priors today, one of the key
aspects of Tenorio was missing: prosecutors under subsection
667(f)(2) did not interfere with an unfettered judicial power.
Romero correctly rejected these arguments. With regard to the
first argument, the court found that the trial and appellate courts
misread Tenorio. In Tenorio the court rejected a similar argument
and found that section 11718 could not be characterized as a limita-
tion on prosecutorial discretion: "It is no answer to suggest that this
is but a lesser included portion of the prosecutor's discretion to
forego prosecution, as the decision to forego prosecution does not
itself deprive persons of liberty."337 Tenorio's discussion of the arbi-
trary and unreviewable nature of executive power was not an argu-
ment that focused on the extent of the executive's power. Instead,
the evil in section 11718 was that judges were unable to act without
prosecutorial approval. 338 As the supreme court observed, the At-
torney General and the prosecution missed that point.339
The state's second argument in Romero was a nonsequitur.
There is no question that the legislature can limit judicial power.
For example, the legislature can prevent courts from striking prior
felonies.31 That power flows from a different separation-of-powers
argument-that "in our tripartite system of government it is the
function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe
stricken from the accusatory pleading except upon motion of the district attorney."
Id. at 94, 473 P.2d at 995, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
334. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 515, 917 P.2d at 637, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
335. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94,473 P.2d at 996,89 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
336. See, e.g., People v. McKissick, 151 Cal. App. 3d 439, 199 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1984)
(upholding prohibition against judicial striking of gun-use allegation to allow a grant
of probation). In this regard subsection 1385(b) explicitly disallows judges from
striking prior felony convictions under section 667.
337. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94,473 P.2d at 996,89 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
338. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 512, 917 P.2d at 635, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796
(stating that "to require the prosecutor's consent to the disposition of a criminal
charge pending before the court unacceptably compromises judicial independence").
339. See id. at 513-14, 917 P.2d at 636-37,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-98.
340. See id. at 513, 917 P.2d at 636, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
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punishments. 3 41  Since Tenorio the legislature has exercised its
authority to limit the power of courts to strike prior felonies.342 This
appears consistent with the allocation of power between the judicial
and legislative branches. Thus, the legislature can prevent either
branch from striking prior offenses. That was the effect of subsec-
tion 1385(b). 34
Tenorio, however, was concerned with the allocation of power
between the judiciary and the executive. In limiting the court's dis-
cretion, the legislature cannot condition the use of judicial discretion
on the approval of the prosecutor.344 In other words, Tenorio re-
quires, and Romero merely reaffirms, that if prior felonies are to be
struck at all, the court must be able to raise the issue on its own mo-
tion.
Such a result makes sense in light of the policies underlying the
separation-of-powers doctrine. Prosecutors make decisions that are
largely unreviewable and out of public view. 45 While prosecutors
serve the interests of justice, they also serve an advocacy function.34
Entrusting them with unreviewable discretion concerning whether
striking prior felonies furthers the interests of justice limits the abil-
ity of the adversary system to educate the decision. By comparison,
judges make decisions in open court after both advocates have ad-
dressed the issue. Judges, more so than advocates, act in further-
ance of justice; such action is synonymous with judging.3 47
Despite public criticism of the California Supreme Court, ex-
amination of the Romero decision suggests that the result was justi-
341. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 917, 519 P.2d 1073, 1076, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652
(1974) (quoting In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,414, 503 P.2d 921, 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
219 (1973)).
342. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
343. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(b) (West Supp. 1997).
344. See Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94-95,473 P.2d at 996-97, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
345. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
13.3 (1984) (commenting that under the separation-of-powers doctrine, generally,
"courts are not to interfere with [the] exercise of discretion by the executive branch
of government" (citing Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973)); see also Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970)
(concluding that the Attorney General could not be compelled by mandamus to
prosecute suspected civil rights violators); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1965) (stating that courts are not to interfere with the discretionary powers of
United States attorneys in their control over criminal prosecutions).
346. See Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94,473 P.2d at 995, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
347. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(8) (1990) ("A judge shall
dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly.").
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fled. The constitution provides for a separation of powers348 that is
widely accepted as an important aspect of democratic government.m'
While the court engaged in some strained statutory analysis,35' it did
so explicitly to avoid conflict between the separation-of-powers
clause and the legislation.3 51 The clear message was that a contrary
reading of "three strikes" would have violated the state constitution.




Critics of the federal judiciary often argue that federal courts
are antidemocratic.353  But that is by design. The Framers of the
Constitution saw virtue in an independent federal judiciary.354 No
doubt, there are times when popular sentiment should be resisted
348. See CAL. CONsT. art. III, § 3 ("The powers of state government are legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may
not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.").
349. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-4, at 21-22
(2d ed. 1988) (recognizing that "no complex society can have its centers of power not
'offset against each other as checks,' and resist tyranny"); see also Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The purpose [of the doc-
trine of separation of powers] was, not to avoid friction... incident to the distribu-
tion of the governmental powers among three departments, [but] to save the people
from autocracy.").
350. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
351. The California Supreme Court declared that if it adopted the state's con-
struction of the statute, "the statute would appear to violate the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers." Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 513, 917 P.2d at 636, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
The court considered many possible statutory interpretations of the "three-strikes"
law and rejected all of them. See id. at 517-32, 917 P.2d at 639-49, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
800-10.
352. See supra notes 320-44 and accompanying text.
353. See generally BORK, supra note 31, at 351 (warning that the "politicization"
of the federal judiciary was encouraging judges "on to still greater incursions into
Americans' right to self-government"); ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURES 25 (1989) (arguing that the unchecked, stringent enforcement of constitu-
tional rights by the federal judiciary "may in fact undermine the capacity for durable
constitutional government"); CHARLES RICE, LEGALIZING HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT:
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1984)
(expressing concern that federal decisions regarding homosexual rights demonstrate
an increasing judicial supremacy over state law).
354. James Madison, quoting from Montesquieu, wrote in support of an inde-
pendent judiciary: "'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul [sic], for the judge
would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor."' THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338
(James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. 1966).
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and courts should uphold principle over popular will. At times,
separation of powers and judicial independence may be antidemo-
cratic. Arguably, this is one of the virtues of our system.
355
This Article has argued, though, that in the case of "three
strikes," the California Supreme Court's decision in Romero was not
antidemocratic. Many factors have combined to prevent rational
debate about the law: the combination of public and media hysteria
over the Klaas killing;356 the political opportunism of elected offi-
cials;357 the failure of other politicians to voice objections;358 the
power politics of victims' rights advocates armed with money from
the prison-industrial complex;359 the absence of any measures requir-
ing voters to decide how they want to pay for the prison construction
required by "three strikes";36 and misstatements in campaign litera-
ture supporting Proposition 184.361
The electorate was not asked, for example, whether it wanted to
incarcerate a two-time burglar past the peak of his criminal career
for twenty-five years to life when his third felony was for possession
of crack cocaine or whether it wanted similar penalties for two-time
felons convicted of possession of marijuana. Consistent with public
opinion surveys3? 2 and Proposition 184 campaign literature, 63 the
355. See Maxwell S. Pfeifer, Unwarranted Attacks on Judges Must End, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1996, at 2 ("An independent judiciary is essential to our democratic society
and is to be treasured and protected."); Thomas C. Platt, Insuring an Independent
Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., July 8,1996, at 2 ("[A]n independent judiciary is the cornerstone
of good government."); see also Merritt, supra note 33, at All (arguing that as newly
democratic countries, such as Russia and those of Eastern Europe, strive to obtain
the same liberties as Americans, they are using the American judicial system, but not
its executive or legislative branches, as a model).
356. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Part II.E.
359. See supra Part II.B.
360. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (discussing the ballot initia-
tive); see also Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Initiative and Sinking Fund Proposal,
FED. SENTENCING REP., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 80 (noting that most state corrections
budgets will not feel the immense impact of "three strikes" until several years from
now, Law Professor Ronald F. Wright observed that "the remoteness in time of the
costs of Three Strikes laws gives legislators a powerful reason to discount those costs.
... The long time frame makes the cost seem politically irrelevant and easy to ig-
nore.").
361. See supra Part II.G.
362. See generally Joseph W. Queen & William Murphy, Race Doesn't Dictate
Politics, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1996, at 29 (reporting that 82% of the public favor life
sentences under the "three-strikes" law for those convicted of three violent felonies).
363. See California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 36 ("3 Strikes keeps career
criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder, behind
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electorate wanted long prison sentences for murderers, rapists, and
other violent felons. One noted commentator suggests that many
California citizens might not approve of the broad sweep of "three
strikes."364
Reforming "three strikes" in the legislature would have been
difficult. Prior to Romero, State Senate President Pro Tern Bill
Lockyer appeared ready to attempt reform by withholding legisla-
tion to fund new prisons that would be made necessary by "three
strikes" unless its scope was narrowed.3  Whether those efforts
would have succeeded is unclear. Perhaps not fully understood by
the electorate, use of the initiative process makes legislative reform
extremely difficult. The legislature cannot amend initiatives unless
the amendment is approved by the voters, or unless the original ini-
tiative provides otherwise; the "three-strikes" initiative permitted
legislative amendment by requiring a two-thirds approval by each
house.3
"Three strikes" also included a technical provision that voters
almost certainly would not have fully appreciated. Subsection
667(h) provides that "[a]ll references to existing statutes in subdivi-
sions (c) to (g), inclusive, are to statutes as they existed on June 30,
1993.2367 The effect of this provision is to prevent the legislature
from removing offenses from the list of serious or violent felonies.
In other words, it cuts off one area of legislative reform, for exam-
ple, by removing burglary from the list of prior offenses that may
count as a strike.
Romero has given the legislature a second opportunity to cor-
rect the excesses of "three strikes." It is unclear, however, whether
this will occur.
bars where they belong.").
364. Professor Franklin Zimring believes that public support for "three strikes" is
mixed. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at Al. Although the public widely supports the
law applied to violent repeat offenders, Professor Zimring estimates that 80% of the
public is opposed to applying "three strikes" to minor offenses, such as stealing a
piece of pizza. See id.
365. See Andy Furillo, 'Three Strikes' Collides with California's Bursting Prisons,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al.
366. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 6670) (West Supp.
1997). Romero's critics fail to acknowledge that requiring a supermajority to reform
bad legislation is itself antidemocratic. See generally supra note 30 and accompany-
ing text (providing criticism of the Romero decision as being antidemocratic).
367. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(h).
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Immediately after Romero, commentators differed over the ef-
fect of the decision.38 Despite some misleading headlines,36 9
Romero leaves intact key provisions of the law.37 0 That judges may
exercise discretion to strike prior felonies does not mean that they
will routinely do so. Some commentators argued that judges would
use that power infrequently in light of two facts. First, most judges
currently serving are Wilson and Deukmejian appointees-not
likely to be the liberal judges so feared by the proponents of "three
strikes."37' Second, even liberal judges understand the public's de-
sire for long prison terms for repeat offenders. 72
An examination of the data of "three-strikes" cases during the
first two years of its application reveals a contrary argument-that
discretion may result in judges avoiding application of "three
strikes" in a large number of cases.373 For example, application of
"three strikes" has occurred in far more cases involving marijuana
use than in cases involving violent felons.374 Violent felonies are a
368. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., Claire Cooper, "3 Strikes" Provision Tossed Out, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 21, 1996, at Al; Christopher Reed, 'Three Strikes' Law Is Ruled Out by
Judges, THE GUARDIAN, June 22, 1996, at 14.
370. Since the court did not decide Romero on constitutional grounds but rather
upon strict statutory interpretation, judges can still issue maximum sentences as out-
lined by "three strikes." See Burden of Proof (CNN television broadcast, June 24,
1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing how the very nar-
row discretion now afforded to judges actually supports the sentencing required by
"three strikes").
Criminal law experts, including academics, prosecutors, and defense attor-
neys, stress that the Romero ruling is narrow in scope. See Dan Berstein, Judges
Seem Unlikely to Undo 'Three Strikes', SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1, 1996, at A8; see
also Burden of Proof, supra (quoting Los Angeles County Deputy Public Defender
Alex Ricciardulli and Attorney General Dan Lungren's disagreement with the co-
host's assertion that Romero "gutted" "three strikes").
371. See John Jacobs, Editorial, More Posturing on 'Three Strikes', SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 30, 1996, at F4 (noting that Republican Governors Deukmejian and Wil-
son have appointed every judge over the past fourteen years and that most judges
independently elected to the bench since then have been former prosecutors).
372. See Krikorian & Morain, supra note 33, at Al (discussing that judges will ex-
ercise their discretion only in limited circumstances because they recognize the need
for criminal incarceration); see also Dan Morain, Ruling May Force '3 Strikes' Back-
ers to Dilute Law, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at A3 (quoting Senator Lockyer's
statement that "most of the judges won't strike priors").
373. See Front-Line Fights Over 3 Strikes, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1996, at Al (citing
Los Angeles County statistics which indicate that a third strike is most likely to be a
drug offense; specifically, 28% of third strikes were for drug crimes, and 10% in-
volved petty thefts).
374. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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small part of the total number of felonies committed.37 s Hence, in
many, if not most cases, judges will be faced with defendants ac-
cused of having committed nonviolent third strikes. As in Romero a
judge may be tempted to accept a plea bargain for a felon whose fi-
nal strike involves drug possession.-7
A. S.B. 331: Undoing Romero
Despite a lack of evidence of Romero's impact,3" Assembly
Speaker Curt Pringle and Senate Majority Leader Rob Hurtt pro-
posed a response to the decision. 78 Authored by Hurtt, S.B. 331
would have added a new subsection to section 1385.37' As proposed,
subsection 1385(c) would have severely limited the exercise of a
judge's discretion. A judge could "strike" a prior felony only if
three conditions were met: (1) none of the defendant's prior felony
convictions was for a violent crime; (2) the current charge is neither
violent nor serious; and (3) the defendant has not committed a prior
felony during the last five years that such defendant was not in cus-tody.Y38
S.B. 331 also would have added language to subsection 667(g)
allowing the prosecutor to decide not to charge a prior felony con-
viction, subject to a requirement that the prosecutor notify the court
of all prior felony convictions and explain the decision not to charge
those prior felonies.38 ' An amended subsection 667(f) would have
specified the legislature's intent that prior convictions should be
pled and proven except in unusual circumstances."
375. According to the 1994 crime index, violent felonies accounted for 13.3% of
total felonies in 1994. See CRIME IN THE U.S. 1994, supra note 240, at 8 chart 2.3.
376. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 506-07, 917 P.2d 628,
631-32, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 792-93 (1996).
377. See 'Three Strikes' Discretion, FRESNO BEE, June 22, 1996, at B6 (suggesting
that a far wiser course than immediate legislative response would be to wait and see
how significant the consequences of Romero will be).
378. See Sweeney, supra note 278, at 5 (noting that Pringle and Hurtt formed a
coalition of "three-strikes" supporters to draft a legislative response to Romero).
379. See S.B. 331, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §
1385).
380. See id.
381. See id.; see also Dan Goodin, New 'Three Strikes' Bill Could Put Heat on
Hallinan, RECORDER (San Francisco), July 9, 1996, at 4 (noting that the provisions in
S.B. 331 are designed to put political heat on district attorneys who aren't aggressive
in applying "three strikes").
382. See Cal. S.B. 331 (providing the following as not sufficient reasons for a
prosecutor to decline to plead and prove a prior felony conviction: (1) disagreement
with subsections 667(b)-(i), the "three-strikes" legislation; (2) plea bargaining, ex-
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Mike Reynolds and Secretary of State Bill Jones touted S.B.
331 because they believe Romero is "thwarting the will of the peo-
ple. ,3 3 Despite their support and Senator Hurtt's threat of political
reprisal, S.B. 331 failed in the Senate.314 While it passed through the
assembly with overwhelming bipartisan support, only one member
of the Senate Criminal Procedure Committee voted in favor of the
bill
3 85
The Senate Committee's action reflects the change in the politi-
cal climate since passage of A.B. 971 and Proposition 184. Some
legislators were finally focusing on some of the realities of "three
strikes." In the two years since its passage, its dragnet effect on
nonviolent felons has become increasingly obvious.38  The issue of
paying for prisons, conveniently put off during passage of A.B. 971,
has come front and center.3 7 Legislators know they must act soon to
find massive funding for prison construction if we are to have
enough cells to warehouse the projected prison population.3 2  Re-
flecting the new climate, Senator Lockyer opposed S.B. 331 because,
like "three strikes," it was a "waste of taxpayer money directed at
imposing life imprisonment on petty criminals.
389
B. A.B. 2122: A More Moderate Proposal
Assemblyman Phil Isenberg, now a victim of term limits,391 in-
troduced A.B. 2122 in August, 1996.391 A.B. 2122 died in the Senate
Criminal Procedure Committee. 2 As amended during the summer,
cept in unusual circumstances; or (3) a perceived need for reduction of case loads).
383. Vincent Schiraldi, Three Strikes, Reprise, RECORDER (San Francisco), Aug.
28, 1996, at 4. But see id. (arguing that the will of the people cannot be frustrated
because no one asked the voters to choose between a "three-strikes" bill that would
provide for judicial discretion in nonviolent cases and one that did not).
384. See Sweeney, supra note 278, at 5 (noting the sole vote in favor was from the
committee's only Republican member).
385. See id.
386. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
387. See Vitiello, supra note 2, at 452-53 & nn. 332-36,458 & nn 359-60.
388. See id.
389. Sweeney, supra note 278, at 5.
390. See Ed Mendel, Legislatures Coming to Terms with Their Limits, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 9, 1996, at A3.
391. A.B. 2122, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§
667, 1170.12).
392. Legislators chose not to move ahead with A.B. 2122 before the close of the
1995-1996 Regular Session. See Dana Wilke, Democrats Seem Slow to Revamp
Three-Strikes Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 20, 1996, at A3. Instead, the ses-
sion ended with the bill sitting idle in the Senate Criminal Procedure Committee.
See 1 ASSEMBLY RECESS HISTORY, 629 (Cal. 1995-1996 Reg. Sess., Oct 7, 1996)
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it would have limited a judge's discretion only in cases involving a
third strike that was a serious or violent felony. 3 A.B. 2122 would
have left section 1385 intact.
394
The Isenberg bill would have had a similar effect as the original
Rainey bill: enhanced sentences would have been mandated only
for those felons whose third strike was at least a serious felony."'
But A.B. 2122 would still have allowed a judge to impose penalties
under "three strikes" for other felons.
C. Save "Three Strikes" Public Safety Act of 1998: Another
Initiative
After the Senate Criminal Procedure Committee voted down
S.B. 331, Mike Reynolds filed a new initiative. Both the CDAA and
the California Correctional Peace Officers Association supported
the initiative.3" Draft No. 6, revised on August 2, 1996, would im-
pose limits on judicial discretion similar to those proposed in S.B.331 .391
Like S.B. 331, a judge may strike a prior felony only if three
conditions are met.398 The first two are the same as those in S.B. 331,
namely, that none of the prior convictions was for a violent felony
and the current charge must be neither a serious nor violent fel-
ony.399 Even more severe is the third cumulative requirement, that
the defendant not have committed a prior serious felony in at least
ten years while not in custody.4° Also modeled on S.B. 331 is the
provision that allows a prosecutor discretion not to charge a prior
felony but requires the prosecutor to file a notice with the court
enumerating the felonies and explaining the basis of the decision not
(listing history of A.B. 2122).
393. See Cal. A.B. 2122 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(0).
394. Rather than amend section 1385, A.B. 2122 sought to limit judicial discretion
by amending the original "three-strike" legislation. See id.
395. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
396. See Pamela J. Podger, Reynolds Pushes 'Save Three Strikes' Initiative,
FRESNO BEE, Oct. 3, 1996, at B1 (citing Larry Brown, who heads the CDAA, as say-
ing that the initiative surpasses legislative fixes and that prosecutors may help raise
money for the proposed initiative).
397. See Save "Three Strikes" Public Safety Act of 1998, at 8 (Aug. 2, 1996) (fax of
Draft No. 6 received by the CDAA) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
398. See id. at 9.
399. See id. at 9-11 (proposing amendments to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385); supra
note 396 and accompanying text (detailing S.B. 331's requirements for judicial dis-
cretion).
400. See Save "Three Strikes" Public Safety Act of 1998, supra note 397, at 9.
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to charge. °1
V. CONCLUSION: RESTORING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Despite numerous attacks on the supreme court that Romero
violated the will of the people,42 the court did no such thing. As de-
veloped above, "three strikes" passed amidst public and media hys-
teria. Its passage was marred by opportunism by some politicians
and by a lack of courage of others.! Victims' rights groups, backed
by money from organizations benefiting from the prison construc-
tion boom, dominated the debate over "three strikes. '' 414 Even Marc
Klaas's defection could not slow passage of "three strikes," absent
meaningful opposition!"5 Campaign literature supporting Proposi-
tion 184 underscores how skewed the debate was: It promised to
lead to the incarceration of murderers, rapists, and child molesters
but failed to mention that California citizens also would have to pay
for long incarceration of two-time felons convicted for possession of
narcotics.4
The drafters of A.B. 971 attempted to protect "three strikes" by
including a provision requiring a supermajority to amend its provi-
sions.4 That provision now requires proponents of "three strikes"
to compromise if they want to secure passage of legislation.
As discussed above, Romero has given the legislature the op-
portunity for rational debate that was lacking when A.B. 971 sailed
through the legislature in 1994.'08 Since that time, Polly Klaas's kil-
ler has been convicted and sentenced to death.4°9 The public now
has less concern about crime.410 News reports of some of the ex-
cesses of "three strikes" seem to have brought to the public the rec-
401. See id. at 8 (proposing amendments to CAL. PENAL CODE §
1170.12(d)(2)(B)).
402. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 99-104, 145-78 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 203-46 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 353-76 and accompanying text.
409. See Mary Curtius, Klaas Killer Sentenced to Die, Stuns Court, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1996, at Al.
410. See Celinda Lake, Voters Want Action on Crime, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994,
at 11A (reporting that crime was voters' top concern in 1994). But see Clinton De-
nies Tobacco Curbs Are Diversion from Drug Stats, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1996, at
6A (illustrating decline in voters' concern about crime). In 1996 crime was the vot-
ers' third concern, ranked behind education and the economy. See id.
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ognition that "three strikes" was not quite what it was advertised to
be Concern among some minority communities-traditional
Democratic constituencies-has given Democratic politicians in-
centive to temper "three strikes. 412 If the legislature returns to
"three strikes" as a result of Romero, in light of post-1994 develop-
ments and the need to achieve a two-thirds majority, the chance of
rational reform of its excesses increases.
Less certain is the initiative process. There, the most ardent
supporters of "three strikes" need only a majority of the elector-
ate. But the forces that combined to silence opposition to "three
strikes" may not be able to prevail a second time. In 1994 no politi-
cian was willing to take a visible, principled stand against A.B. 971
or Proposition 184.4' 4 Since then, as indicated above, the public has
begun to recognize the excesses of "three strikes," and its opponents
have regained some visibility. 5 In an atmosphere less polluted by
fear and anticrime hysteria, the electorate may focus on the eco-
nomic arguments. Public debate on achieving similar reductions in
crime for significantly less money may hit home as it did not during
the original campaign for "three strikes.,
416
At this point, one can only speculate whether Reynolds's new
initiative will qualify for the ballot, and, if it does, whether it will
pass. But only because of Romero do California citizens have the
opportunity to debate "three strikes" a second time, hopefully, more
dispassionately than in 1994.
411. Editorials have heightened public awareness of the defects of "three strikes"
by detailing individual cases of shocking punishments. See A Return of Judgment to
the Judging Process, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at B8 (recounting the pizza thief who
was incarcerated for life); see also Judicious Decision, ORANGE COuNTY REG., June
23, 1996, at G4 (discussing the same case); Furthering Justice, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., June 22, 1996, at B6 (stating that twice as many defendants receive tough sen-
tences for marijuana possession than for violent crime).
412. See Vitiello, supra note 2, at 455-57 & nn. 347-53.
413. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(a) (requiring a majority vote of the electorate for
passage of an initiative).
414. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
415. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
416. See supra Part ILL
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